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Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will: 
Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, and 
Beyond 
 
Riccardo Repetti 1 
 
Abstract 
This is the fourth article in a four-article series that exam-
ines Buddhist responses to the Western philosophical 
problem of whether free will is compatible with “deter-
minism,” the scientific doctrine of universal lawful causa-
tion. The first article focused on “early period” scholar-
ship from the 1970’s, which was primarily compatibilist, 
that is, of the view that the Buddhist conception of causa-
tion is compatible with free will. The second and third ar-
ticles examined “middle period” incompatibilist and semi-
compatibilist scholarship in the remainder of the twenti-
eth century and first part of the twenty-first. The present 
article examines work published in the past few years. It 
largely agrees that Buddhism tacitly accepts free will (al-
                                                
1 Department of History, Philosophy, and Political Science, Kingsborough College, 
CUNY. Email: rrepetti@kingsborough.edu. 
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though it also explores an ultimate perspective from 
which the issue appears moot), but mostly divides along 
compatibilist and incompatibilist lines, mirroring Thera-
vāda and Mahāyāna Buddhist perspectives, respectively. 
Of the writers I emphasize, Gier and Kjellberg articulate 
both perspectives; Federman and Harvey advocate Thera-
vāda compatibilism; and Wallace argues that although de-
terminism and free will are incompatible, subtle complex-
ities of Mahāyāna Buddhist metaphysics circumvent the 
free will and determinism dichotomy. Although the pre-
sent article focuses on these writers, as the culminating 
article in the series it also draws on and summarizes the 
other articles in the series, and directs the reader to other 
recent period works that, due to space constraints, cannot 
be reviewed here.2 
 
Overview and Disclaimer  
There are few passages, if any, in canonical or authoritative Buddhist 
texts that explicitly address anything remotely resembling the philo-
sophical problem of free will. This series of four articles is intended as an 
in-depth guide to the secondary literature on Buddhism and free will, a 
fairly small and relatively recent body of writings that began roughly 
within the past half century. Although these four articles appear in this 
                                                
2 I would like to thank Daniel Cozort, Peter Harvey, and an anonymous reviewer for 
their many helpful questions, clarifications, objections, and editorial suggestions, and 
Asaf Federman for his review of the section on his work. The writing of this article was 
supported in part by my participation in the National Endowment for the Humanities 
2012 Summer Institute, “Investigating Consciousness: Buddhist and Contemporary 
Philosophical Perspectives,” in Charleston, South Carolina. 
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journal, the intended audience is not only scholars and students of Bud-
dhist ethics, but also Western philosophers who for the most part have 
only recently begun to take Buddhism seriously and to try to mine it for 
ideas, arguments, theories, and alternative ways of knowing.  
 This dual audience complicates matters. On the one hand, many 
Buddhist scholars are not only unfamiliar with the Western philosophi-
cal problem of free will and its many iterations in the hands of soft ver-
sus hard determinists, libertarians, compatibilists, incompatibilists, and 
semi-compatibilists, but are also unfamiliar with what other Buddhist 
scholars have written about free will. (I will explain these terms below.) 
Even much of the work of Buddhist ethicists betrays varying degrees of 
unfamiliarity with relevant doctrinal distinctions pertaining to diver-
gent forms of Buddhism as well as to divergent theoretical perspectives 
within Western philosophy. On the other hand, Western philosophers 
who wish to explore what Buddhists think about free will might be sig-
nificantly unfamiliar with basic Buddhist ideas such as Dharma, depend-
ent origination, and the twelve-linked chain, or classic examples such as 
the chariot and its parts, not to mention doctrinal differences within the 
various traditions and schools of Buddhist thought. (I will explain these 
ideas briefly below.)  
Some of the work I will review in this article, for example, by Gier 
and Kjellberg, seems to presuppose an extensive background in Buddhist 
thought. This is despite the fact that it is contained in an edited collec-
tion of otherwise entirely Western analytic philosophical articles on free 
will, presumably targeting a Western audience. I wrote this series of 
articles in order to aid scholars on both sides of the Western/Buddhist 
divide in their attempts to understand the many often confusing if not 
conflicting claims to be found within the extant secondary literature.  
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Review of Early- and Middle-period Scholarship  
My analysis of early-period and middle-period scholarship, in the earlier 
articles in this series,3 supports the idea that the Buddha’s teaching is 
mental-freedom-oriented and rests upon his doctrine of pratītya-
samutpāda (dependent origination), the general doctrine that every 
event originates in dependence on multiple simultaneous and/or previ-
ous conditions, and the particular application of this generalization to 
the nidānas (twelve causal links in the chain of suffering). As the Buddha 
stated, “When that is present, this comes to be; on the arising of that, 
this arises. When that is absent, this does not come to be; on the cessa-
tion of that, this ceases” (MN I 262 ff.; SN II 28). Note that, on its face, this 
description does not assert that causation is anything more substantive 
than a conditional relationship: when this condition is satisfied, that 
condition occurs. 
 For ease of reference, let’s call this minimalist description the 
Buddha’s “conditionality formula.” Determinism presupposes that a 
metaphysically maximalist nomological (lawful) necessity—what Jay 
Garfield describes as the “cement of the universe”4—serves as the truth 
condition for any instantiations of the conditionality formula. Thus, few 
Buddhists would be willing to equate minimalistic conditionality with 
maximalistic determinism; Charles Goodman appears to be one notewor-
thy exception.5 By way of objection, however, it does not follow that just 
because instantiations of the minimalist conditionality formula are true 
that there is no maximalist nomological necessity that accounts for their 
truth. Reluctance to acknowledge something does not evidence that it 
                                                
3 Repetti (“Earlier,” “Reductionism,” and “Hard Determinism”); see, also, Repetti (“Med-
itation”). 
4 Garfield (“Causality”). 
5 Goodman (“Resentment”); for a critical review, see Repetti (“Hard Determinism”). 
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does not exist. What makes it reliably the case that the conditionality 
formula is true? That it makes sense to ask this question suggests that 
something stronger than mere coincidence must be in play. Although it 
is conceivable that everything that appears to involve a substantive 
causal relationship might amount to no more than a “constant conjunc-
tion” between event pairs, as David Hume famously suggested (and 
thought was all that empirical observation served up, technically),6 it is 
implausible in the face of the widespread contemporary scientific under-
standing of causal laws as exceptionless nomological generalizations.7 If 
nomological necessity does ground conditionality, Buddhist conditional-
ity would ultimately reduce to a partly opaque form of determinism.  
                                                
6 Hume (Treatise). 
7 On the understanding of causation that has the broadest consensus in the Western 
philosophical and scientific communities (Woodward and Hitchcock, “Generaliza-
tions”), laws support an indefinite number of counterfactuals, that is, statements of the 
form, “had x happened, then y would have happened,” and/or subjunctives, statements 
of the form “were x to happen, then y would happen,” both of which imply something 
stronger than mere Humean constant conjunction insofar as they imply that all past 
cases that would have satisfied the antecedents of these conditionals would also have 
satisfied the consequents of these conditionals, that all future cases that satisfy the 
antecedents of these conditionals will also satisfy the consequents of these condition-
als, and that all possible cases that hypothetically satisfy the antecedents of these 
conditionals also satisfy the consequents of these conditionals. For example, let an 
instantiation of the subjunctive “were x to happen, then y would happen” be “were a 
particular grain of salt to be submerged in water, then it would dissolve.” This subjunc-
tive conditional is true, and it remains true even if that particular grain of salt is never 
submerged in water. The scientific understanding of the nomological necessity in-
volved in these counterfactual and/or subjunctive conditionals attributes the solubility 
of salt to its crystalline atomic structure and the structure of water molecules, in which 
case the scientific understanding of the causation of salt’s solubility and/or its actual 
dissolving in water requires an interpretation of causation that is not only stronger 
than Humean constant conjunction, but also stronger than Buddhist conditionality, 
despite the fact that the counterfactuals and subjunctives involved in the explication of 
laws are conditionals themselves. 
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 Early-period scholars clearly resisted equating Buddhist causa-
tion (dependent origination) with either a “rigid” determinism or a 
“chaotic” indeterminism, opting for a “middle way” between both.8 
Some middle-period scholars, however, accepted an outright “hard 
determinism,”9 the view that determinism is true and entails an invaria-
ble series of events, entailing that whatever happens is inevitable and 
that we lack free will.10 Others opted for what is nearly the same view, a 
“semi-compatibilism” according to which determinism remains “hard” 
in terms of ruling out agential autonomy at the level of ultimate reality 
but is “soft” in terms of being compatible with the sort of free will (in the 
                                                
8 Repetti (“Earlier”). 
9 Repetti (“Hard Determinism”). 
10 Hard determinism resembles fatalism, but differs from it in one crucial respect. What 
these doctrines share is that both entail a singular future series of necessary events, no 
member-event of which is agent-alterable or agent-avoidable. The crucial difference is 
that determinism explains this necessity causally, such that event Ea causes event Eb, Eb 
causes Ec, and so on, whereas fatalism simply asserts the acausal necessity of all events 
Ea, Eb, Ec, . . . , En. Hard determinism seems initially, therefore, to be a more rational 
doctrine. Ironically, however, some fatalists at least entertain the possibility that 
agents might actually be able to make (unfortunately futile) different choices and 
efforts to alter what is fated, whereas hard determinists deny that agents are even able 
to engage in any deliberations, or make any choices or efforts, other than those that are 
pre-determined. Some hard determinists concede that determinism alone does not rule 
out the truth of counterfactual hypotheticals about how an agent could have done 
otherwise had motivational and related conditions been otherwise, but they insist that 
because agents cannot bring it about that pre-agential conditions are ever otherwise, 
agents lack any ability to alter the pre-determined future. That is, they think this 
“ability” is impotent, null. To my understanding, this is a key point of disagreement 
that differentiates hard from “soft” determinism, which latter view embraces the idea 
that certain forms of agential control, although determined, render undesirable out-
comes sufficiently evitable for purposes of moral responsibility. 
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moral-responsibility-entailing sense) that we attribute to persons at the 
level of conventional reality.11  
My own view is that, if we assume that dependent origination is 
deterministic, then the Buddha’s teaching should be characterized as 
“soft determinism,” the view that determinism is true, that free will (in 
the moral-responsibility-entailing sense) is real, and that determinism 
does not entail inevitability (because knowledge of volitional causes and 
effects renders undesirable actions and outcomes avoidable). The Bud-
dha rejected the idea that actions are inevitable, and he rejected fatalism 
on that ground (DN I 249-253).12  
Arguably, the Buddha seems to have tacitly accepted a minimalis-
tic sense of “free will” involving wholesome volitional regulation in 
connection with progress along the Buddhist path. Because mindful 
volitional regulation fosters mental freedom and mindless unregulated 
volition fosters mental bondage, I think the Buddha would consider the 
only relevant type of free will one that involves volitional regulation, as 
                                                
11 Repetti (“Reductionism”). The meaning of the Buddhist distinction between “ulti-
mate” and “conventional” reality is disputed among most schools of Buddhist thought 
(Thakchoe, “Truths”), and thus is itself worthy of at least a book-length treatment. A 
sketch will suffice for now: The distinction maps loosely on the appearance/reality 
distinction, such that conventional reality is how things appear to the unenlightened 
mind, namely, they appear to be substantive and independently existing, whereas 
ultimate reality is how things are independently of conceptualization altogether, 
namely, they are insubstantial and exist only dependently. The meaning of this distinc-
tion will come into greater focus below. 
12 Dīgha Nikāya (DN), “Long Discourses.” Goodman (“Resentment”) rightfully disagrees 
with the equation of hard determinism and fatalism, because fatalism is acausal, as I 
noted earlier. However, Harvey (“Freedom”) and Federman (“Buddha”) each argue 
forcefully that hard determinism and fatalism share the implication that actions are 
inevitable, which I also noted earlier, that the Buddha rejected the idea that actions are 
inevitable, and thus that the Buddha would have rejected hard determinism. 
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opposed to the sort of unregulated volitional expression associated with 
free will in the West—the freedom to do as one pleases or to express 
one’s volitions spontaneously in actions. Regulated volitional expression 
may be described as “controlled” will and unregulated volitional expres-
sion may be described as “unrestrained” or “free” will, where “free” 
implies “spontaneous.” According to Buddhism, it is regulated will that 
leads to the central Buddhist goal of liberation or mental freedom—
freedom precisely from the sort of mental bondage caused by unregulat-
ed will.13 
There is a related compatibilist sense of “free” will that consists 
in the will’s being proximately controlled by the agent (such as when 
choices and actions are voluntary, as opposed to involuntary), and a 
semi-compatibilist sense of “free” will that consists in the will’s being 
reason-responsive (such as when the agent has a moral reason to refrain 
from a certain action and does so). But reason-responsiveness grounds 
the designation “free,” not based on considerations about whether the 
will is regulated or unregulated, but on the Kantian idea that moral 
responsibility implies free will. That is, it is grounded on the idea that 
“‘ought’ implies ‘can’”: if reason-responsiveness is sufficient for moral 
responsibility, then there is a minimal sense in which the reason-
responsive agent must be able to behave morally, even if the fact that 
the agent is reason-responsive is determined and thus the agent cannot 
be truly autonomous in the sense that full-blooded autonomy requires 
that the agent’s choices not be determined. Proximate agential control 
over the will and reason-responsiveness are, according to compatibilists 
and semi-compatibilists, respectively, sufficient for purposes of moral 
responsibility.  
                                                
13 This line of thought calls to mind an interesting parallel: between unregulated voli-
tional expression as a chief cause of individual suffering and unregulated consumerism 
as a chief cause of collective suffering, but that is a topic for another inquiry. 
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Again, the Buddha would likely only consider the type of free will 
that is relevant to the Buddhist path—and thus the only form of free will 
that is worth cultivating—that of regulated will, on the one hand, and he 
would likely consider that type of free will that consists of unregulated 
will to be antithetical to the Buddhist path, on the other hand. For this 
reason, in arguing for what I take to be the most reasonable form of free 
will that is implicitly relevant to Buddhism, I restrict my focus to the 
relationship between regulated will and mental freedom, because it is 
only by reference to liberation that any form of free will—even regulated 
will—becomes relevant to Buddhism at all. Thus, when I refer to the 
Buddhist notion of free will, I mean the regulated will that is cultivated 
on the path to liberation.  
It must be emphasized that this interpretation and emphasis does 
not necessarily involve the same conception of free will in play in vari-
ous Western or Buddhist accounts of the subject, not to suggest that 
there is a single conception of free will in play in both or either. Rather, 
it is simply the interpretation that I am arguing for, perhaps on slightly 
revisionist grounds. I think that both the compatibilist and semi-
compatibilist senses of free will—for example, the will’s being proxi-
mately controlled by the agent and its being reason-responsive, respec-
tively—may be accounted for in Buddhist terms along the lines of voli-
tional regulation. Most of us, unfortunately but realistically, possess very 
little of this sort of free will: control over our own volitions. Buddhist 
practitioners possess it increasingly, however, covariant with their 
cultivation of mental freedom, and typically through meditative and 
related cognitive disciplines.14 
My review of early- and middle-period scholarship supports the 
following remedial distinctions, then. Buddhism differentiates between 
                                                
14 See Repetti (“Meditation”). 
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the agency of āryas (noble persons), that is, Buddhists with some degree 
of enlightenment (those at the rank of stream-enterers, once-returners, 
non-returners, and Arhats,15 and/or those well established in the strong 
insight that leads to each of these), on the one hand, and non-āryas, on 
the other. For ease of reference, I will refer loosely to the latter group as 
“worldlings.”16 Although there are exceptions, worldlings typically pos-
sess varying degrees of relatively minimal or merely potential agency, in 
light of their habitually unrestricted volitional expression, which 
strengthens mental-bondage-fostering dispositions; Buddhist practition-
ers, however, cultivate volitional regulation, which increases mental 
freedom. Because volitional regulation is consistent with determinism, it 
does not entail “libertarianism,” the view that we have free will and that, 
because free will and determinism are incompatible, determinism is 
false.  
Fully enlightened persons enjoy full mental freedom, and even 
though they transcend ego-volitional behavior, they possess some sort of 
                                                
15 Stream-enterers have attained the first of the four stages of enlightenment in signifi-
cantly recognizing the truth of the Dharma and committing to the Buddhist path, once-
returners have attained the second stage in reaching an initial state of spiritual trans-
formation that entails they will reincarnate once more in human form at most before 
attaining enlightenment, non-returners have attained the third stage in reaching an 
advanced state of spiritual transformation that entails that they will not reincarnate 
again in human form before attaining enlightenment, and Arhats have attained the 
fourth, final stage of full enlightenment. Christopher Gowans (“Philosophy,” 13) coined 
the neologism, “stream-observer,” to identify another relevant category: one who is 
examining the Dharma to see if Buddhism’s main claims and soteriological strategies 
are credible and worthy of pursuit. For the many Western practitioners of Buddhist 
meditation who seem to be traveling significantly but not fully along the Buddhist path 
(as an informal experiment that tests the teachings through direct experience), these 
categories may be fuzzy or overlap.  
16 “Worldlings” is restricted to anyone that has not attained the first stage of realiza-
tion, whether or not they are Buddhist practitioners. 
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self-regulative control in that they are masters of volitional regulation, 
arguably a form of free will.17 If they lack ego-volitions, arguably, they 
perform no actions attributable to them and therefore they are not de-
termined. Here, the word “they” is ambiguous: one sense involves refer-
ence to an ontological agent that doesn’t exist or function in actions and 
the other to a psychological agent that does exist and function in ac-
tions. Thus, in the psychological sense, “they” do perform actions, tech-
nically, such as advising, teaching, walking, and so on, but their actions 
are impersonal manifestations of compassion, untainted by ego-based 
                                                
17 This claim may seem puzzling on its face because if there is no longer any illusion 
about a genuinely existing ontological self or agent, the idea of self-regulation seems 
impossible. But what is puzzling about it, arguably, might just be our own association 
with an ontological self: surely an enlightened being can have a highly functional 
psychological self—effective agency—with no illusions about its ontological status. 
Buddhist lore is full of such highly effective Arhats and bodhisattvas. Perhaps the 
intuition is that absent any ego-based (delusional) volition the Arhat is not the causal 
nexus of her actions, but rather the universe is, not unlike the way spontaneous action 
is conceived in Daoism: control or regulation, on this view, is only necessary or even 
possible when there is a perceived conflict between volitions and/or preferences, but in 
Arhats there cannot be any such conflict. But this seems to overly idealize enlighten-
ment in a way that ignores real possibilities, such as the one illustrated by the Buddhist 
story of the Arhat who met a close friend of his deceased father’s one day who insisted 
on the monk’s drinking with him, to excess (Rinpoche, Chariots, 22), to use just one 
example. The idea is that even Arhats can be presented with compelling volitions, their 
own or others’, and despite how typically effortless or spontaneous it may be to navi-
gate them, they still need navigating, and sometimes that navigation might have to be 
nonspontaneous or deliberative. Conceivably, an Arhat could be drugged, and presented 
with elaborately compelling pressures that require volitional regulation; or a neurosci-
entist could kidnap the Arhat and insert a remotely-controlled chip in its brain that 
generates powerful unwholesome volitions. The point is that an Arhat is arguably 
capable of exercising volitional regulation, should the need ever arise, even if the need 
typically never arises. By analogy, salt remains soluble even if it will never be sub-
merged in any liquid. 
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volition or any ontological-self illusion, and thus they generate no kar-
ma.  
If we assume that dependent origination is sufficiently determin-
istic, we can call this model of impersonal enlightened action “virtually-
libertarian-soft-determinism” because in the absence of any ontological 
self there can be nothing to undermine maximally effective psychologi-
cal agency, the functional equivalent of a psychological self’s autonomy 
in the absence of belief in any ontological self. Enlightened action pro-
vides an analogue of the limit case of autonomy that the libertarian 
thinks obtains and which implies that determinism is false. But this 
model is consistent with determinism, hence “soft,” and thus only virtu-
ally libertarian. Buddhist practitioners are typically relatively-soft-
determined—by degree, relative to their degree of regulated volitional 
development. And worldlings are typically virtually-hard-determined—by 
degree, relative to their largely unregulated volitional underdevelop-
ment and almost utter lack of volitional control—but capable of being 
relatively-soft-determined upon hearing the Dharma.18  
Some key issues remain open following my review of early- and 
middle-period scholarship. One is the interpretation and impact of the 
anātman (non-self) theory, the Buddhist doctrine about the metaphysi-
cal/ontological insubstantiality of the self. Until fairly recently, this was 
a uniquely Buddhist view: what people take to be a substantial and per-
manent self-essence to a person actually is a mereological (part/whole) 
fabrication of the aggregates—of form (matter), sensation, perception, 
volition, and consciousness—that constitute us and account for all our 
behavior and experiences. Thus, despite the clarification afforded to the 
                                                
18 Of course, many worldlings cultivate greater degrees of volition regulation ability for 
non-Buddhist moral, religious, or spiritual reasons, but to the extent that they do there 
is likely some overlap with the bases of their behavior and the teachings of Buddhism.  
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issue by the distinction between the psychological and ontological sens-
es of the self, it remains a puzzling question whether something that is a 
non-self can exhibit self-regulation (volitional control). Some Buddhist 
philosophers, such as Charles Goodman,19 patently deny that a non-self 
can have any abilities at all, much less autonomous control over them. 
Others, such as Mark Siderits,20 think that the “two truths” doctrine 
enables Buddhists to both deny that there is a substantive self and to 
assert that persons ordinarily exhibit free will.21 According to this doc-
trine, often called upon to address philosophical puzzles in Buddhism, at 
the conventional reality level free will (possibly in the moral-
responsibility-entailing sense, but clearly in the volitional regulation 
sense) matters, but at the ultimate reality level there is no substantive 
self and thus no (metaphysically real) “agency.”  
Early-period scholarship mostly shares a neutral, middle-path 
position between “rigid” (hard) determinism and “chaotic” (libertarian) 
indeterminism that I call “wiggly-determinism” and which I have argued 
is unsuccessful.22 Goodman,23 one middle-period scholar, simply embrac-
es hard determinism, whereas Siderits,24 another middle-period scholar, 
adduces a “paleo-compatibilist” position between hard determinism and 
libertarian indeterminism by parsing each at different levels of reality 
                                                
19 See Goodman (“Resentment”); see also a critique in Repetti (“Hard Determinism”). 
20 See Siderits (“Paleo-compatibilism”); see also a critique in Repetti (“Reductionism”). 
21 The “two truths” is another description for the distinction between ultimate and 
conventional reality. See Thakchoe (“Truths”) for an excellent introduction to the 
complexities of this doctrine. 
22 Repetti (“Earlier”). 
23 Goodman (“Resentment”).  
24 Siderits (“Paleo-Compatibilism”). 
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(where the levels are what are compatible). I have argued that Siderits’s 
position amounts, on analysis, to a form of semi-compatibilism.25 
Most early- and middle-period scholars sought a neutral position 
that might apply to all Buddhist traditions. Most recent-period scholars 
endorse more tradition-specific non-neutral positions. Nicholas F. Gier 
and Paul Kjellberg26 show that the Theravāda tradition tends to be com-
patibilist whereas the Mahāyāna tradition tends to be significantly in-
compatibilist. Asaf Federman and Peter Harvey agree that the Theravāda 
tradition is compatibilist. B. Alan Wallace argues that although deter-
minism is incompatible with free will, the anti-realism of the Mahāyāna 
perspective transcends the dichotomy of free will versus determinism 
altogether. Let us begin our review of recent-period scholarship with an 
analysis of the views of Gier and Kjellberg. 
 
Gier and Kjellberg: Pā l i  versus Mahāyāna Buddhism27 
Gier and Kjellberg’s intellectually rich contribution to this discussion 
(“Buddhism”) is challenging for two reasons: 28 first, it attempts to en-
                                                
25 Repetti (“Reductionism”). 
26 Gier and Kjellberg (“Buddhism”). 
27 For Western readers new to scholarly Buddhism, Pāli is the language used to inscribe 
the original Buddhist canon. The Pāli Canon is the only fully surviving early Canon in 
an Indic language. Parts of other such canons survive in Chinese and Tibetan transla-
tion; later Indian Buddhist texts survive mostly in Sanskrit. Theravāda is the surviving 
form of Pāli Buddhism. Gier and Kjellberg use the term “Pali” (an Anglicized “Pāli”) 
somewhat ambiguously, sometimes to refer to elements of the Pāli Canon, but other 
times intending what is normally denoted by the term “Theravāda.” Because I quote 
their usage extensively, I will maintain “Pāli” for their use of the term when reviewing 
but not quoting their ideas. 
28 Gier and Kjellberg (“Buddhism”). 
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gage a Western philosophical audience, and second, it shows how philo-
sophically complex are the issues connected with free will in light of the 
divergence between earlier and later Buddhist doctrines. Although it 
may be overly ambitious, it is an important piece because it largely 
succeeds. Their article is situated within an edited collection of articles 
on the problem of free will,29 the others of which approach the problem 
entirely from a Western analytic philosophical perspective, making no 
significant mention of Buddhism or even of Asian philosophy. Many of 
Gier and Kjellberg’s ideas are directed toward what other contributors to 
that volume have said. This dimension of their thought helps explain 
why they address certain matters that might not seem relevant to a 
Buddhist audience.  
 Gier and Kjellberg open by paraphrasing the Buddha in a way 
that highlights the complexity of the Buddhist position on free will and 
moral responsibility: “There is free action, there is retribution, but I see 
no agent that passes out of one set of momentary elements into another 
one, except the [connection] of those elements” (277).30 This quotation 
supports the idea that the Buddha does not deny the sort of voluntary 
action typically associated with moral responsibility, but simultaneously 
expresses the paradox that there could be intentional action without any 
diachronic (non-momentary) agent. There is a prima facie tension be-
tween these ideas, but Gier and Kjellberg do not resolve it. They present 
divergent Buddhist views without choosing among them. All I hope to 
achieve here is to analyze, elucidate, and pose problems for selective 
elements of their overview. 
Engaging with one Western analytic understanding of free will 
that rests on the distinction between mere desires and preferences (as 
                                                
29 Campbell, O’Rourke, and Shier (Determinism). 
30 Quoting Stcherbatsky (Logic), 133. 
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expressed by Keith Lehrer in the same volume but traceable to Harry 
Frankfurt),31 Gier and Kjellberg argue that the “Buddhist is an agent of 
her preferences . . . rather than being just a passive victim of her desires” 
(283). There is something right about one part of this claim, because 
through mindfulness and related disciplines Buddhists aim to cultivate 
detachment from—and to a certain extent control over—certain kinds of 
desires, some of which, from the perspective of the Buddhist path, may 
be parsed as preferences.32 However, the other part of this claim seems 
at odds with the Buddha’s denial of an agent (in their opening quote), a 
problem they will address later on.33 They assert that Buddhist “deter-
minism,” unlike standard Western interpretations, is not linear: “Bud-
dhist causality . . . is seen as a cosmic web of causal conditions rather 
than linear mechanical notions of push-pull causation” (283). To them, 
non-linearity in causality evades the fatalistic sting of linear determin-
ism, according to which event A necessarily and inevitably causes event 
B, B necessarily/inevitably causes C, C causes D, and so on, leaving no 
wiggle room for free will.  
                                                
31 Lehrer (“Freedom”). Earlier on, Frankfurt (“Freedom”) differentiated between base-
level desires and higher-order desires, which comes close to the same thing: if I prefer 
desire D1 over desire D2, then I have a higher-order desire D3 for D1. 
32 See Repetti (“Meditation”) for a complex development of this idea. 
33 Gier and Kjellberg make a number of incautious generalizations in their introductory 
section. For example, they claim that “While the issue of free will does not arise in 
Buddhism, it is indisputable that it embraces a universal determinism” (283), but our 
discussion about the minimalism of conditionality above stands in opposition to this 
interpretation. In support of their determinism claim, they say Buddhism asserts that 
“every effect, without exception, has a cause,” but nobody doubts this tautology. They 
must have meant to say every event has a cause, but that claim is neither obviously true, 
nor universally agreed upon (for example, in quantum mechanics). And, as they will 
later on acknowledge, some Buddhists view causation in minimalistic terms as a form of 
conditionality that does not seem deterministic at all. 
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However, it is doubtful that non-linear causality circumvents in-
evitability: if everything co-influences everything else, it seems to make 
more sense to think that each multi-directional causal arrow remains 
linear than it does to think that things become metaphysically fuzzy, as 
in wiggly-determinism. On this interpretation, arguably, there are indef-
initely many more linear causal arrows in Buddhist causal interdepend-
ence than there are in standard determinism. Causal interdependence 
simply multiplies and over-determines the inevitability of determin-
ism—yielding a kind of multi-directional Buddhist mega-determinism in 
which every particle/event is maximally necessitated by every other 
one, rather than an inchoate wiggly-determinism.34 
Gier and Kjellberg invoke the early-period Buddhists’ wiggly-
determinism conception, however, when they quote the Buddha to say 
that if there were a one-to-one karmic relationship, liberation would be 
impossible, adding: “They who know causation . . . know the Dharma” 
                                                
34 Using simple gravitational attraction as an illustration, compare a simple linear 
determinism whereby event A causes event B, on the one hand, and a complex, 
interdependent determinism whereby a single particle P exerts a causal—say, 
gravitational—force on all other particles in the universe while simultaneously all other 
particles in the universe exert a counter-gravitational force on particle P, and so on for 
every particle in the universe with respect to every other one, on the other hand. In the 
simple case where A causes B, there is a straightforward linear direction of influence 
from A to B, whereas in the interdependence of mutual gravitational influences, there 
are linear influences from each particle in the universe to and from each other particle 
in the universe. Although this is a much more complex structure of influences, within 
this complex structure it is still possible in principle to discern and map linear 
connections from and to each particle in the universe. It is in this sense that 
interdependence does not entail nonlinearity or nondeterminism, but rather is 
consistent with mega-linearity or mega-determinism. The difference, then, is not 
between a case of linearity versus nonlinearity, but between singular linearity (a single 
line of causal influence from one particle to another) and multiple linearity 
(indefinitely many lines of causal influence from all particles onto each particle). 
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(284).35 But this interpretation seems to conflate causation with karma. 
Some Buddhists—some Yogācāra idealists, for example—might argue, 
however, that because all conditioned phenomena are mind-dependent, 
they are volitional and hence karmic. Apart from this minority view,36 
however, karma appears prima facie to be a subcategory of causation that 
the Buddha restricted to the volitional: “Volition, intention, O Bhikkhus, 
is what I call Kamma” (AN III 415).37 Admittedly, however, nothing in the 
Buddha’s quotation here is inconsistent with the Yogācāra view that 
everything conditioned is conceptualized and thus intentional, volition-
al, and thus karmic.  
Gier and Kjellberg seem to acknowledge the more restricted in-
terpretation when they state: “The definition of karma as volitional 
action is not only good Pali Buddhism but it is also the position of the 
great Mahayanist philosopher Vasubandhu: ‘karma is will (cetanā) and 
voluntary action (cetayita karanam).’”38 Of course, nothing in this quota-
tion from Vasubandhu is inconsistent with the Yogācāra view either. I 
cannot resolve these conflicting interpretations here, but I can provide 
an analysis that will circumvent the disagreement. 
Thus, the Yogācāra views in question here are that all condi-
tioned phenomena are conceptualization-dependent and that all that is 
conceptualized involves mental formations (saṃskāras: volitions). To-
gether, these views ground the Yogācāra equation of karma and causa-
tion. Alternately put, if causal relations are conceptually embedded and 
                                                
35 Quoting DN I 249-253. 
36 Peter Harvey deems the question whether causation and karma are identical worthy 
enough to warrant significant critical discussion of the issue based on canonical sources 
(“Freedom”). 
37 Aṅguttara Nikāya (AN), “Further-factored Discourses.”  
38 Gier and Kjellberg (301 fn. 16), citing Stcherbatsky (Conception), 32.  
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all conceptualization involves mental formations (volition), then all 
conditioned or causal phenomena are karmic. From non-Yogācāra Bud-
dhist perspectives as well as from the Western analytic philosophical 
perspective, not everything that is intentional or mental is volitional 
because, for example, simple perceptual experiences, such as one ex-
pressed by the statement “that blotch is red,” are intentional because 
they are about something other than themselves (this one is about that 
blotch). But there is no phenomenological element, nor any conceptual 
implication, in this sort of color-perception-involving intentionality of 
any kind of volitional constituent, construed as some form of teleology, 
conation, desire, want, need, aim, end, goal, purpose, and so on.39 Thus, 
even though everything volitional is intentional (because everything 
volitional aims at, and thus is about, some object or experience beyond 
itself), not everything intentional is volitional.40 
                                                
39 The Yogācāra advocate might argue that, according to the doctrine of interdependent 
origination, insofar as every experiential item invokes vedanā (the skandha of “feeling” 
or “feeling tone”: positive, negative, or neutral) and every vedanā invokes saṃskāras 
(volition), it follows that even simply perceiving a red blotch involves volition. I am not 
sure, however, that Arhats are subject to this, in which case even if it is true of world-
lings that color perception invokes volition, it is not true tout court, and thus there is no 
entailment from color perception to volition or, put differently, there is no interde-
pendence between color perception and volition. More importantly, “neutral” feeling 
tone is arguably just the absence of feeling tone. 
40 However, there may even be exceptions to the claim that all volitional states are 
intentional because they aim at something beyond themselves. It seems possible to experi-
ence non-intentional volitional states, such as cravings or fears that are unspecific, that 
is, that lack intentional objects or things at which they aim. Indeed, generalized anxiety 
disorder (“GAD”) seems to be one example that has made it to the Diagnostic Statistical 
Manual, but there are others. Arguably, even if GAD has no object toward which it aims, 
it may remain intentional in the weaker sense that it is about something, even if what it 
is about is opaque. 
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Let me suggest a simple way to preserve—and thus circumvent 
the conflict between—the differences between the Yogācāra conceptions 
of causation as karmic (volitional), on the one hand, and the non-
Yogācāra Buddhist and Western analytic conceptions of causation as 
nonkarmic (nonvolitional), on the other. Let us call “volitionalY” (where 
the superscripted “Y” designates “Yogācāra”) the view that all condi-
tioned phenomena and hence all causal phenomena are conception-
dependent, thus intentional/volitional, and thus karmic. Importantly, 
whether or not everything is volitionalY, there remains a valid distinc-
tion between those phenomena that are intentional/volitional in the 
non-Yogācāra Buddhist and Western analytic senses and those phenom-
ena that are not intentional/volitional in the non-Yogācāra Buddhist and 
Western analytic senses, which latter phenomena we can call “volition-
al~Y” (where the superscripted negated “~Y” refers to “non-Yogācāra,” 
and includes other Buddhist and Western conceptions).  
This distinction holds regardless of whether the Yogācāra view is 
correct. That is, if the Yogācāra view is correct, then volitional~Y would 
just be a subset of volitionalY, because not everything that is volitionalY is 
volitional~Y, though everything that is volitional~Y would be volitionalY. 
And if the Yogācāra view is incorrect, volitional~Y obviously remains 
valid independently of the category of volitionalY because the Yogācāra 
view is the only reason on offer to think everything seemingly nonmen-
tal is mental. 
Thus, it is a separate, open question whether or not everything 
conditioned or causal is volitionalY. Whether or not everything condi-
tioned or causal is volitionalY, however, it is clear that not everything 
conditioned or causal is volitional~Y. Likewise, if we use “karmaY” for the 
Yogācāra conception of karma, and “karma~Y” for the non-Yogācāra 
Buddhist and/or Western analytic conceptions of karma (volition or 
volitional action), we can say that whether or not everything causal is 
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karmicY, it is clear that not everything causal is karmic~Y. (I will only use 
these superscripted suffixes when the text requires them for clarity of 
intended meaning.) 
It may be relevant to note that karma may be wiggly in ways in 
which causation is not. Western philosophers have argued that volition-
al~Y determinism does not function one-to-one because non-volitional~Y 
causes can also affect volitional~Y circumstances, just as non-economic 
causes can also affect economic circumstances.41 Even within Buddhist 
thought, volitional~Y actions do not invariably lead to precisely the same 
kind of result, as the present character of a person doing an action also 
contributes to an effect (AN I 249-53) and future circumstances may 
affect how and when karmic~Y results arise or their degree of intensity. 
For example, someone who has become an ārya can no longer be reborn 
at less than a human level. But none of this suggests that determinism 
simpliciter runs afoul of one-to-one causal correspondences. Rather, it 
just enlarges the set of causal conditions to include volition~Y-extrinsic 
factors, any set of which together would produce identical—linear, one-
to-one—results if collectively repeated.42 
Shifting gears, Gier and Kjellberg adduce insightful connections 
between Aristotle’s ideas about the mean with the Buddha’s similar ideas 
about the middle path, apply them to the choices of the mindful versus 
those of the unmindful, and attribute lack of mindfulness both to ascetic 
and worldling extremes, extremes that were predominant in the Bud-
dha’s milieu. They reason that “the mindful ones are free, while the ones 
tending to either extreme are not” (284). This insightful observation is in 
accord with my distinction above between relatively-soft and virtually-
hard determinism, respectively. Further adducing insightful connections 
                                                
41 Davidson (Actions). 
42 See note 35 regarding multiply complex causal conditions remaining deterministic.  
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with Western philosophy, Gier and Kjellberg incorporate Keith Lehrer’s 
ideas about meta-preferences,43 adding:  
We can now define Buddhist free agents as . . . free from 
ego attachment and craving either for ascetic deficiency 
or indulgent excess, representing karmic bondage rather 
than karmic freedom. Free and mindful agents . . . can 
separate desires from cravings. . . . Buddhists believe in 
‘free action’ but have no conception of ‘free will’, as a self-
determining power that moral agents somehow possess. 
(284-285)44  
In applying Lehrer’s analysis to mindful volitional cultivation, 
however, they seem implicitly to accept agents’ “self-determining” 
compatibilist power to form and approve volitions. They will 
acknowledge, shortly, that this conception is plausible within Pāli Bud-
dhism. Their initial resistance to this interpretation owes to the inflated 
construal of autonomy they attribute to the European conception: “It is a 
supreme irony that what European philosophers assumed is necessary 
for true human freedom is actually the cause of its greatest bondage” 
(285). They are referring to the Western idea that the source of free will 
is in the conception of the self-ruling agent, a conception that has domi-
nated Western philosophy until fairly recently. They admit, however, 
that if “autonomy” means not controlled by craving, then Pāli Buddhists 
would accept the “concept of agent autonomy, where agents learn to 
control their cravings and act on their preferences” (285). This volition-
                                                
43 Lehrer (“Preference”).  
44 It should be noted that their remarks here about Buddhist free agents would only 
apply to those Buddhists who are fully enlightened: Arhats and Buddhas. 
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regulating model would suffice for a form of Buddhist compatibilism, as I 
have argued,45 but they do not develop it.  
Instead, they revisit wiggly-determinism (285-86). Referring to 
David Kalupahana, they say: “For him Buddhist conditionality represents 
a middle way between strict determinism and the destruction of 
freedom . . . and an equally unacceptable indeterminism” (285). They 
characterize Buddhist causation as summed up in the Buddha’s 
conditionality formula, “When that is present, this comes to be . . .” 
(286), which they equate with non-linear interdependence, and they insist 
that the Buddhist focuses on how to eliminate duḥkha (suffering) by 
eliminating its conditions—something rather linear in the twelve nidānas. 
Quoting Edward Conze, they state: “If the total number of conditions is 
unlimited, and most of them are unknown, it is impossible to say which 
condition of necessity brings about which event” (287).46  
In support of this line of thought, one might ask: How can one 
condition on its own bring about an effect? It seems always to be the 
case that several conditions are needed, with some of these being neces-
sary conditions. Often what we mean by “the” cause of something is the 
last condition to fall into place, or perhaps the most significant one. As 
Buddhaghosa, speaking on the twelve nidānas (in the Visuddhimagga), 
says, “there is no single or multiple fruit . . . from a single cause; nor a 
single fruit from multiple causes. . . . But one representative cause and 
fruit are given in this way, ‘with spiritual ignorance as condition are the 
constructing activities’” (Vism. XVII 106).  
Notwithstanding Conze’s and Buddhaghosa’s intuitive claims, 
complexity and opacity do not entail non-linearity, as I argued above. 
                                                
45 Repetti (“Meditation”). 
46 Conze (146 fn.).  
302 Repetti, Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will  
 
Indeed, the most threatening version of hard determinism focuses on 
maximally-complex world-states, such that the entire world-state W1 at 
time T1 determines W2 at T2 in accordance with all the laws of the 
universe (say, L1, L2, L3, . . . Ln), collectively, “L”: W1 nomologically-
necessitates (or L-necessitates) W2, W2 L-necessitates W3, and so on, and 
we are powerless to alter this globally-determined sequence.47 But the 
nomological elements in global-states do not invalidate the linear 
sequencings that form those global-states: rather, because global world 
states and their local constituents are interdependent, the whole 
“interdependent versus linear” dichotomy is a false dichotomy, easily 
dismissed by describing interdependence as multi-linear.  
There is another problem with the issue of the causation of world 
states. Most Buddhists accept mereological (part/whole) reductionism:48 
any apparent whole that decomposes to a partite aggregate (a collection 
of parts) is a mereological fiction. This is classically illustrated in the 
Milindapañhā with Nāgasena’s chariot example: a chariot is nothing 
above the configuration of parts designated as such relative to our inter-
ests. One may object, therefore, that “global” or “world” are the greatest 
aggregate-based mereological fictions; and because determinism and 
interdependent co-origination (conditionality) are both global in scope, 
from the mereological reductionist perspective to which Buddhism is 
committed, both determinism and conditionality are, on analysis, mer-
eological fictions!  
The Pāli material, one might reply, focuses more on a small num-
ber of conditions—say, twelve (the twelve nidānas)—for any state, in 
which case the Pāli theorist might reject the global interpretation of 
dependent origination. However, both mereological reductionism and 
                                                
47 See van Inwagen (Essay). 
48 Siderits (Persons). 
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the no-self doctrine extend to all conditioned phenomena, which are 
thus “empty”—lacking inherent natures, independently existing essenc-
es, or ontologically objective lines of demarcation that could individuate 
entities (parts/wholes) in ultimate reality. Certain Abhidharma atomists 
who assert that at the ultimate reality level there are impartite psycho-
physical atoms are an exception.49 However, being able to individuate 
psychophysical atoms is not the same as being able to block laws about 
their aggregation-level behavior in the form of world-states (or, on a 
much smaller scale, in the form of mental states), at least not at the level 
of ultimate reality, where everything is interdependent. If everything is 
interdependent, then nothing is independent of anything else, and thus 
every putative atom is really just an aspect of the globally interconnect-
ed totality.50  
Nonetheless, suppose we reject “global” but retain the nomologi-
cal connections between all interdependent conditions (C1, C2, . . . Cn),51 
collectively, “C,” that jointly constitute the world-aggregate W1 at time 
T1 and jointly cause event E1 under L at T2. But all events (E1, E2, . . . En), 
collectively, “E,” at T2 that constitute aggregate-W2 are caused by C. So, C 
produced E (aggregate-W1 caused aggregate-W2), which means C1, C2, and 
so on, simultaneously produced E1, E2, and so on. Even so, this analysis 
does not obliterate the linear determinism that obtains between aggre-
gate-W1 and aggregate-W2 (such that it is a law that W1’s cause W2’s) or 
                                                
49 For a relevant discussion of Abhidharma atomism, see Siderits (Persons). 
50 In fairness, this line of objection ought to be directed more at Buddhism than at Gier 
and Kjellberg’s attempt to articulate it. 
51 These may be psychophysically atomic conditions, if Abhidharma is correct, or quan-
tum potentialities, if physics is correct, or both, if both are accurate descriptions of the 
same phenomena under different modes of presentation, as an East/West convergence 
metaphysician like B. Alan Wallace might put it (Dimensions). For purposes of the line of 
reasoning in the text, however, it does not matter which interpretation is correct. 
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that might still obtain between each element of C and each element of E 
(for example, between C1 and E1, C2 and E2, and so on). The same holds for 
the indefinitely-many cause/effect pairs that constitute any two succes-
sive aggregate-world-states,52 even if every psychophysical atom or 
quantum-energy-unit causes effects in, and is causally affected by, every 
other psychophysical atom or quantum-energy-unit in the same instant. 
Thus, interdependence makes possible indefinitely-many more linear 
causal pairs for determinism—yielding a mega-linear-determinism!53 
Moving away from the issue of causation, Gier and Kjellberg turn 
to the Pāli conception of the self as a process. As we shall see when we 
turn to our review of the accounts of Asaf Federman and of Peter Harvey, 
most scholars who see the Pāli conception of the self as a mere process 
rather than as an entity consider the Pāli conception to be deflationary. 
However, Gier and Kjellberg’s characterization seems somewhat inflated, 
for they say that the Pāli self is depicted as “a robust personal agent fully 
capable of maintaining its personal integrity and taking full responsibil-
ity for its actions” (289). Their implicit support for this somewhat inflat-
ed description seems to contrast with a more minimalistic conception of 
the self they will describe shortly in connection with Mahāyāna Bud-
dhism.  
                                                
52 However, recalling the Buddhaghosa quote in the text above, dependent origination 
is not about one thing, on its own, being the cause of another. For example, although it 
is said that craving is dependent on feeling, this only applies to unenlightened beings 
that still have ignorance. Thus, the same putative cause does not have the same effect 
(in beings at different stages along the path). All things considered, if dependent 
origination is not deterministic, then there simply is no problem in Buddhism analo-
gous to that posed by determinism for free will in Western philosophy. If dependent 
origination is either not deterministic or not coextensive with determinism, and 
determinism is true, then Buddhism simply has to come to grips with it. 
53 This criticism, too, is not directed specifically at Gier and Kjellberg, but rather to any 
Buddhists who embrace a wiggly determinism. 
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In further dissecting the idea of a free agent, they deny a Bud-
dhist notion of “the will” but emphasize cetanā (volition). They claim the 
Pāli conception of the person involves a middle-way posit between nihil-
ist (anātman: the negation of the existence of a self) and eternalist (āt-
man: soul, conceived as eternal) extremes, and they conclude that Pāli 
Buddhism “falls under the general rubric of compatibilism and ‘soft’ 
determinism” (289). I agree with many of their claims, but their supports 
for these claims are mostly scattered and inexplicit. 
In the remainder of their analysis, Gier and Kjellberg focus on 
Mahāyāna sources, mainly Nāgārjuna. After outlining three standard 
arguments (impermanence, reductionism, and insubstantiality) for the 
insubstantial view of the self, they paraphrase Nāgārjuna, stating “if we 
cannot say that the self really exists, by the same token we cannot say 
that the self really does not exist” (291). They do not explain here why it 
would be a mistake to assert or deny the self, though in their subsequent 
discussion they seem to be laying out an understanding of Nāgārjuna’s 
thought on the basis of which the reader may surmise the explanation. 
Based only on their presentation, however, that understanding is not 
obvious, although this difficulty likely owes more to Nāgārjuna’s ideas 
than to Gier and Kjellberg’s attempts to explicate them. Instead, Gier and 
Kjellberg problematize the very Pāli/Mahāyāna distinction that is the 
target of their work: 
The Pali versus Mahayana distinction is now not very 
helpful, so henceforth we will distinguish between 
‘constructive postmodernism’ (CPM) and a skeptical 
‘deconstructive postmodernism’ (DPM). . . . CPM is 
generally realist and supportive of the canons of logic and 
evidence, while DPM rejects realism and any logocentric 
methodology. Nagarjuna is a consummate logician and 
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never rejects logic as a standard, so this obviously causes 
problems for any DPM reading of him. (291-292)  
Although this somewhat anachronistic juxtaposition is insightful, 
and although these differences promise to be explanatory regarding the 
Buddhist free will issue, Gier and Kjellberg draw from them no explicit 
conclusion about Buddhism and free will. This supports my impression, 
suggested earlier, that they are simply surveying important elements of 
terrain that need to be charted in order to fully explicate the Buddhist 
understanding of free will. This seems helpful, as far as it goes.54 
On a more interesting note, they suggest “that the phrase ‘phe-
nomenal self’ be used for the Pali tradition and CPM interpretation while 
reserving ‘conventional’ as a placeholder term for the deluded self who 
thinks it lives in a real world of interdependent things and events” 
(292).55 This implies that there is a three-truth-levels division consisting 
of: (1) ultimate; (2) conventional, the relatively deluded perspective of 
the worldling; and (3) an intermediate reality level, the relatively non-
deluded perspective of the ārya.56 After raising this trifurcation, they 
claim that because Pāli Buddhists have a realist concept of truth, they 
can embrace compatibilism, but the explanation for this claim, like many 
                                                
54 Recall that their article was written as the only non-Western piece for an edited 
collection of otherwise all Western views on free will. 
55 Presumably, they meant not “interdependent” but “independent.” It should be noted 
that their use of “conventional” here is somewhat non-representative. 
56 This trifurcation resembles the Pudgalavādin (person-affirming) view (Priestly, 
“Pudgalavāda”), but is arguably equivalent to a two-fold ultimate/conventional parsing 
where the conventional divides in two; there may be valid or invalid conventional 
views. It is uncertain how many Pudgalavādins there have been overall, although they 
constituted roughly a quarter of the Indian Saṅgha (the Buddhist monastic community) 
around the time of the conventions that led to the inscribing of the Pāli Canon, so the 
casual dismissal of their interpretation among many contemporary exegetes is not 
necessarily warranted. 
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others, is left to the reader to surmise from their subsequent remarks—
in this case remarks about Mahāyāna anti-realism that implicitly con-
trast with Pāli realism. 
For example, they suggest that if the correct view of self is the 
Mahāyānist’s thoroughly-conventional self (recall, they reserve the term 
“conventional” for the deluded self),57 “then to ask whether it is free or 
determined is like asking ‘what is the sound of one hand clapping?’” 
(293). However, not all illusions or falsehoods are equal, nor are they 
equally mysterious or paradoxical. According to such diverging theorists 
as Peter Harvey and Mark Siderits,58 the “deluded self” exists as much as 
anything else, though its deluded projection posits a non-existing thing.  
Further sketching important elements of terrain, Gier and Kjell-
berg discuss Nāgārjuna’s assertion of the interdependence of agent and 
action. Nāgārjuna’s idea is that there cannot be an agent without an 
action or a potter without pot-making: the items in these pairs are inter-
dependent and cannot exist independently of their other pair members. 
                                                
57 Does this mean that to believe in self is a thorough delusion? They do not say, but this 
is not obviously a pan-Mahāyānist view of the self. 
58 Harvey (communication, April 2013); Siderits (Persons). However, as Dan Cozort has 
emphasized (communication, July 2013), this interpretation is not shared among all 
Mādhyamikas (followers of Mādhyamaka, the Mahāyāna “middle way” philosophy, first 
clearly articulated by Nāgārjuna, between the extremes of the eternalism of ātman and 
the nihilism of anātman). Thus, although Bhavaviveka (a Svātantrika-Mādhyamika) 
would say that an inherently existent self exists conventionally, Candrakīrti (a 
Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika) and his followers would say that it does not, because such a 
self has no basis of designation. The example of the rope mistakenly taken for a snake 
illustrates for Bhavaviveka that the rope-snake exists conventionally, but for Can-
drakīrti, there is no rope-snake, just a rope mistaken for a snake. Nothing about a rope, 
on his view, could be the basis of designation for a snake. Given these divergent inter-
pretations that bear importantly on the understanding of the self, there is no “Buddhist 
view” of the self.  
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However, one may object that there is an unequal direction to the inter-
dependence: pot-making does not make the person a potter, even if in the 
process of pot-making the person expresses or manifests that she is—and, 
perhaps if for the first time, she thereby becomes—a pot-maker. The 
person is a potter only when making a pot.59  
In concluding this agent/action discussion, Gier and Kjellberg 
state: “Normally we assume there has to be a self or agent in order for 
there to be freedom, but this is just the presumption the skeptical Nagar-
juna questions” (297). Is this meant to imply that they take Nāgārjuna to 
solve the free will issue, or to dissolve it? This is an important question, 
but they do not even raise it explicitly, much less suggest an answer to it. 
Instead, they simply problematize the issue, raising further complica-
tions regarding the self and the no-self views, existence and non-
existence, the four-cornered negation, and so on—all suggestive of but 
lacking explicit explanation, and all supporting my view that they are 
simply identifying terrain rich in explanatory potential. 
For example, Gier and Kjellberg state: “If we cannot call the kar-
mic web free since it lacks a self, by the same token we cannot call it 
determined, since nothing outside of it is causing it” (297). But the oppo-
site conclusion makes more sense: without agency in the karmic web, the 
only thing that could explain web-activity is that it is, or its components 
are, determined. This raises the question whether their reasoning about 
self-lacking karmic webs applies to enlightened persons, who are in 
some sense self-lacking. It seems that agentless enlightened persons 
might still have karmic “webs,” even though they are not entangled in 
                                                
59 This objection resembles a similar objection about the direction of explanation that 
Socrates pressed on Euthyphro about the latter’s idea that piety is whatever is loved by 
the gods. Socrates seemed to think that an action’s being loved by the gods does not 
explain why the gods love the action, but rather that the gods love the action because it 
already is pious, even if it is correct that whatever is pious is also thereby loved by the gods.  
Journal of Buddhist Ethics 309 
 
 
them and even if “their” past karma continues to unfold; only ego-
volitional unenlightened beings are web-entangled.  
One could say that the web of conditions that constitutes an en-
lightened being lacks a separate self or a deluded sense of one. Because 
that being/web is in form and all form is conditioned, that being/web is 
causally determined (karmically or not). But nothing that determines it 
does so in a freedom-undermining manner, at least not on certain compat-
ibilist models according to which the absence of freedom-undermining 
influences plays a constitutive role in ascriptions of free will. According 
to Harry Frankfurt, for example, weakness or failure of will is impossible 
without a separate meta-volitional system in which there is meta-
volition/action discord—for example, when the agent identifies with a 
metavolition to the effect that a particular volition should succeed in 
governing or leading to action, but the meta-volitionally-approved 
volition fails to do so.60 My impression of nirvāṇa is that because it entails 
the extinction of the Arhat’s identification with volitions, it arguably 
eliminates the possibility of meta-volitional/volitional discord. It is not 
clear that enlightened persons lack volitions altogether, for it seems 
plausible that they experience physiological states like thirst, aversion to 
physical pain, and the like, and in their boundless altruism and compas-
sion they seem to intend the welfare of all sentient beings. Presumably, 
however, they are not attached to any of these intentions. Indeed, as 
                                                
60 Frankfurt (“Freedom”). Some interpretations of enlightened beings move in the 
opposite direction. For example, according to Peter Harvey, enlightened beings are said 
to have a “great” or “developed” self, that is, a strong, calm, self-contained personality. 
See Harvey (Selfless), chapter 3 and (Buddhism), 62. According to Harvey B. Aronson 
(Practice), Buddhism denies an ontological self, not a psychological self, and seeks to 
destroy the delusion of an ontological self while strengthening the psychological self. (I 
owe this observation to Dan Cozort in a communication, July 2013.) This interpretation 
resonates well with Harvey’s account (“Freedom”), Federman’s account (“Buddha”), 
and my own account (“Meditation”). 
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Christopher Gowans has argued, they are not even attached to the 
Dharma (Philosophy 59-60). 
Although it is not clear whether Buddhism would accept this pos-
sibility, consider for the sake of argument that there are certain unen-
lightened beings such as insects and other primitive life forms that 
constitutionally seem to lack any sort of self-sense because they lack 
sufficiently complex mental states.61 These creatures are completely 
stimulus/response determined by exogenous conditions impinging upon 
their endogenous conditions in accordance with natural laws. If there is 
no self-sense, they must be exogenously determined. Humans, except 
                                                
61 One reason Buddhists might resist this possibility is that all unenlightened sentient 
beings are thought to experience hedonic states and to be conditioned by ignorance, 
attraction, and aversion—primary conditions of the self-sense. It is not clear that the 
Buddhist conception of the self-sense requires an explicit, conscious, or Cartesian 
thought of the form “I am,” as, perhaps, an anthropocentric animal psychologist might 
require. Another possible source of resistance might be the widespread Buddhist belief 
that non-humans lack the sort of full-fledged intentions that define typical human 
mental states and that are necessary to accumulate karma. My intuitions run counter 
to this idea because it seems that although instinctive or not-fully-conscious behaviors 
are possible without intentions, no actions are possible without some intention, and 
many nonhuman animals engage in what appears to be teleological or goal-oriented 
and thus intentional behavior—actions. I cannot imagine how animal reincarnation is 
possible without karma (and all karma—action—is intentional). But it strikes me as 
though the issue whether nonhumans have volitions is independent of the issue of 
their having any kind of self-sense whatsoever, as it seems intuitive that there may be 
some sort of rudimentary sense of self in any sentient beings that are pain-aversive. For 
evidence and argument in support of the view that all vertebrates and many if not most 
invertebrates have intentions and rudimentary self-sense, see DeGrazie (Animal), 
chapters 3 and 4. The point in this line of thought is that although the description of 
enlightened beings as sentient beings lacking a self-sense presumably picks out something 
true of enlightened beings, insofar as sentient beings lacking a self-sense conceivably 
includes unenlightened beings as well, this description is too inclusive and thus inade-
quate as a definition.  
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perhaps those who are enlightened, have elaborate self-sense systems.62 
Gier and Kjellberg try to explain this asymmetry:  
To the extent that people identify a self, that self is de-
termined by causes outside of it. The more cultivated they 
become on the Buddhist model, the less they think this 
way. The less who think this way? A question that the Eu-
ropean philosopher might ask. Nagarjuna’s answer is, no 
one, really. The nonpersonal web of causes and conditions 
sheds the delusion, or, rather, ceases to give rise to it. 
(297)63 
However, the mystery of how impersonal webs both cause and 
dissolve delusions needs an explanation. Gesturing toward an explana-
tion, Gier and Kjellberg continue: 
Thus, you get the seemingly paradoxical lines from, for 
instance, the Diamond Sutra, that ‘even though infinite 
beings have been saved, none have been saved.’ Thus 
while we would assume that there has to be a self in order 
                                                
62 The reason for my cautious tone is that if Aronson is right in his claim that enlight-
ened beings do not lack a psychological sense of self but only lack the illusion that this 
integrated set of psychological functions constitutes, reflects, or manifests an ontologi-
cal self (Buddhist Practice), however, then the descriptor, sentient beings lacking a self-
sense, would not even apply to enlightened beings. 
63 However, Gier and Kjellberg are not maintaining their own distinctions, for if, as they 
say earlier, the “self” they mention in their first sentence in this quote is a delusion, 
then there is no “it” to be determined. It should be emphasized that although it is a 
philosophically legitimate question whether animals have intentions, karma, and/or a 
self-sense, as suggested earlier Buddhists mostly have assumed non-humans do not 
have the ability to form intention. The Jatakas have many stories of animals performing 
virtuous acts, but these are standardly taken not literally, but metaphorically. 
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for there to be freedom, Nagarjuna would say that there is 
freedom only to the extent that there is not a self. (297) 
As astute as is their identification and analysis of this problematic di-
mension of the issue, it rests on a simplistic equation of the lack of a self-
sense with liberation, on the one hand, and it ignores the crucial distinc-
tion between psychological and ontological senses of the self, on the 
other hand.  
Gier and Kjellberg suggest that the presence of a self-sense is 
what constitutes bondage, and its absence freedom, but if nobody ulti-
mately exists, who experiences the self-sense? Who is bound? It may be 
objected that the Diamond Sutra remark states or embraces the 
wasp/Buddha puzzle, but does not explain or resolve it. Applying Ar-
onson’s distinction between psychological and ontological conceptions 
of self (Practice), I have hinted at a way to explain the Diamond Sutra 
remark and the wasp/Buddha puzzle by reference to the presence of a 
delusional sense of an ontological self in the unenlightened and the 
absence of a delusional sense of an ontological self in the enlightened, 
together with the presence of a functioning psychological self—the 
highly-integrated functionality of the five skandhas (“aggregates”: form, 
sensation, perception, volition, and consciousness)—in both the unen-
lightened and the enlightened, but this is only a sketch. On this interpre-
tation, “the “I am’ conceit” is the delusional sense of an ontological self. 
Nonetheless, this is a deeply puzzling issue, so it is no reflection on Gier 
and Kjellberg that they do not explicitly resolve the puzzle, but instead 
simply point toward its solution.  
The issue may be thought to boil down to an empirical question: 
whether creatures that only experience pleasure and pain and attraction 
and aversion thereof, respectively, have “the ‘I am’ conceit.” Arguably, 
“the ‘I am’ conceit” requires something on the level of a Cartesian 
thought, but it is doubtful all merely sentient beings have the requisite 
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psychological complexity. It is possible that some sentient beings even 
lack hedonic states at all, despite their ability to detect changes in their 
organism/environment field. Gier and Kjellberg claim that the principal 
culprit in suffering is belief in a real self (ātman), which belief “gives rise 
to desires that are ultimately unsatisfiable precisely because no such self 
exists” (297). Conceivably, this complex way of conceptualizing the issue 
might diverge from something much more primitive: there may be a 
conceptually simple or pre-conceptual form of a delusional sense of self. 
But belief in a kind of self-nature is a sophisticated psychological achieve-
ment, however ill-conceived it may be—an achievement presumably 
beyond the cognitive scope of many species of sentient beings.  
This critical line of thought, too, aims more at Buddhism per se 
than at Gier and Kjellberg’s attempts to explain it. Nevertheless, a non-
Buddhist might ask, how does a non-entity (like phlogiston) generate 
beliefs—that it, a nobody, somehow believes—that generate desires that 
belong only to the non-entity (as opposed to another non-entity such as 
the Buddha), without an intentional agent, as per Nāgārjuna’s insistence 
about no action without an agent? What may be said on behalf of the Bud-
dhist view here (which Gier and Kjellberg do not articulate) is that there 
is no real self, but the skandhas—within which the belief arises (and in 
connection with which there are volitional and related implications and 
consequences)—are not non-entities. The Buddha’s exposition about 
dependent origination—in particular, about the way the twelve nidānas 
operate—is meant to suffice here: these ultimately impersonal factors 
operate in such a way that the illusory self-sense arises, grasps, and so 
forth. 
Perhaps implying that the self-issue has been adequately prob-
lematized, Gier and Kjellberg shift focus and claim that because the aim 
of Buddhism is to eliminate the self, the Mahāyānist rejects personal en-
lightenment because that reifies the self. They elevate the ideal of the 
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bodhisattva, one who seeks enlightenment for the sake of others (298). 
But the links in this line of their reasoning are somewhat cryptic, so let 
us pause to reflect on the idea of eliminating the self, on one hand, the 
idea of seeking enlightenment for the sake of others, on the other hand, 
and on the idea that these are supposed to be related as well.  
First, let us discuss the idea of eliminating the self. The way Gier 
and Kjellberg discuss the elimination of the self is somewhat misleading, 
as we have already seen. In Buddhism a key aim is to directly know that 
everything is non-self (not a permanent, substantial self), and this 
insight is taken to lead to the elimination of the deluded view of being such 
a self, and to the elimination of “the ‘I am’ conceit” and its effects: self-
importance, self-centeredness, ego-volition, and so on. This differs from 
the way Gier and Kjellberg speak—as if there is a self and it is to be 
eliminated. 
Let us now discuss their bodhisattva claim, and how this relates 
to their idea of eliminating the self. If bodhisattvas—or āryas or world-
lings, for that matter—are ultimately non-autonomous non-entities, a 
skeptic may ask how can “they” bring it about that they attain or control 
anything for anyone’s sake? Whether one is a worldling, ārya, or bodhi-
sattva doesn’t seem to make a difference here. Arguably, paradoxical 
wisdom implicit in the Diamond Sutra could explain these apparent con-
tradictions, but as presented by Gier and Kjellberg they remain mere 
hints of transcendent wisdom.  
Let us try to further spell out what they seem to imply. As 
Aronson has made clear (Buddhist Practice), Buddhism differentiates 
between ontological and psychological models of the self, and it denies the 
existence of a certain type of ontological self, defined in various ways 
(substantial, inherently existent, unchanging, essence-bearing, 
independent, and so on), but it does not deny the psychophysical 
processes that generally constitute us—it does not deny self tout court. 
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Those ultimately impersonal psychophysical processes—the skandhas—
are erroneously taken to be indicative of an ontological self, and it is that 
false consciousness that vanishes upon enlightenment. The bodhisattva 
ideal is thought by some to be soteriologically superior insofar as its 
altruistic orientation renders it less likely to motivate practitioners by a 
false ontological sense of self that might be engendered by seeking the 
end of one’s own suffering. Most Buddhists who favor both approaches 
would agree that enlightenment is attained when the false ontological 
conception of self is eliminated—not when the psychological self is 
eliminated.  
Because the crucial difference between enlightened and unen-
lightened beings is, on my analysis, the absence or presence of belief in a 
false ontological sense of self, and the object of that belief—the ontologi-
cal self—does not exist, although beings attain enlightenment when the 
false ontological sense of self is eliminated, in ultimate reality there are 
no ontological selves who attain enlightenment. Because actions occur 
without any ontological selves to author them, there is no contradiction 
in the idea that practitioners—who are, in ultimate reality, nothing over 
and above the collection of the skandhas—can “do” things that lead to 
their enlightenment. 
Gier and Kjellberg do a fine job of surveying the many 
problematic and puzzling terrains of Buddhist doctrine and its divergent 
interpretations that need charting by any cartographer of the Buddhist 
understanding of free will. They seem to conclude that Pāli Buddhism is 
compatibilist but naïve, and that Mahāyāna Buddhism transcends the 
free will issue and linear determinism, and is more plausible; but many 
of their more detailed claims are sketchy and many of their more 
pointed arguments are inconclusively suggestive. But they do 
importantly introduce and emphasize major differences in view among 
Pāli and Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophers.  
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Let us turn now to review how scholars on both sides of the 
Pāli/Mahāyāna divide interpret the issues Gier and Kjellberg discuss. Let 
us begin with the earlier, Pāli views, as expressed by Asaf Federman and 
Peter Harvey, beginning with Federman’s account. 
 
Federman: The Buddha Taught  (Theravādin) Compatibilism? 
Asaf Federman’s article is entitled, “What Kind of Free Will Did the Bud-
dha Teach?”64 Of course, because the Buddha never explicitly discussed 
“free will” or “determinism,” technically he never taught any kind of 
“free will.” Citing many canonical passages, Federman argues that the 
Buddha had a “deflationary” conception of volition such as is found in 
the thinking of Daniel Dennett, and he concludes, basically, that Den-
nett-style compatibilism is “what the Buddha taught.”  
 Federman first differentiates “inflated” and “deflated” concep-
tions of agency. His “inflated” model involves a contracausal, acausal, or 
transcendent ability that exempts agency from the physical domain and 
that he considers inconsistent with determinism. The problem with this 
view, however, is that it makes light the Buddhist acceptance of things 
nonphysical: the inconsistency is with the physicalism implicit in the 
standard interpretation of determinism, not with determinism per se, 
for insofar as Buddhism avers that dependent origination applies to all 
conditioned phenomena and that some conditioned phenomena are 
nonphysical, it leaves open the possibility that causality applies to the 
nonphysical. Federman’s “deflated” model involves a natural ability to 
                                                
64 Published in 2010, but a draft was presented at a 2007 conference. Wallace refers to an 
online version of the paper as a later version (relative to the conference). I review 
Federman’s 2010 publication prior to Harvey’s 2007 or Wallace’s 2008 publications 
because both reference Federman’s 2007 draft. 
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reflect on desires, make intelligent choices, act accordingly, and evade 
undesirable outcomes, and that he considers consistent with determin-
ism. The problem with this view, conversely, is that it makes light of the 
Buddhist view of the ultimate insubstantiality of the self or agent and 
thus, arguably, is not deflated enough. Because Federman is advocating 
for a Theravāda-based view here, perhaps this is what Gier and Kjellberg 
had in mind when they stated that the Pāli self is depicted as “a robust 
personal agent fully capable of maintaining its personal integrity and 
taking full responsibility for its actions” (“Buddhism” 289). 
 Federman offers two corresponding definitions of free will. The 
inflated version “defines free will as a power that belongs in the soul, 
transcends the physical, and has ultimate control over the body” (3).65 
Although this sounds very much like libertarianism, Federman does not 
mention this standard term here. The deflated version “defines free will 
as the agent’s ability to control action in conformity with will, when 
there are no constraints that limit performance” (3). Although this 
sounds very much like soft determinism, Federman does not use this 
standard term either.  
Let us call these two models of free will “inflated-FW” and 
“deflated-FW.” A problem with Federman’s eschewing inflated-FW is 
that because the Buddha seems committed to the view that non-physical 
mental factors causally control actions, physical movements and the 
like, Buddhism would not obviously be required to reject inflated-FW on 
that ground alone. From a Buddhist perspective, that something is non-
physical does not entail that it exists outside the causal nexus. Buddhism 
would reject the idea that non-physical mental factors that causally 
                                                
65 By “transcends the physical,” Federman means it is immaterial in the Cartesian sense. 
However, not all libertarians are dualists or immaterialists. See, for example, Kane 
(“Pathways”). 
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control physical movements and the like inhere in an ontologically 
substantive, independently existing, essence-possessing soul, but it 
would be open to accept a deflated or minimalistic conception of the 
non-physical psychological processes that constitute the psychological 
self and to attribute to them a causal control over actions and certain 
bodily behaviors associated with them, which analysis might equate with 
a minimalistic form of libertarianism or partly-inflated-FW. However, it 
is difficult for non-Buddhists to take seriously the idea that the non-
physical remains causal. For example, monists reject dualism because it 
is exceedingly difficult to imagine how anything non-physical like a 
mind or soul could causally interact with anything physical like a brain 
or body. 
A potential problem with endorsing deflated-FW is that very 
young children and even wild animals appear to have it, for they can 
choose where to run. Harry Frankfurt characterizes this (deflated-FW) as 
freedom of action rather than freedom of the will, the latter of which 
involves volitional regulation (“Freedom”). On his analysis, for example, 
an animal can run in the direction it desires to run, controlling its action in 
conformity with its will, but is not an “agent” (in the moral-responsibility-
entailing sense at issue in the Western discussion of free will), nor does it 
exhibit freedom of the will unless it has the sort of will it wants to have—
that is, its effective desires (those that succeed in leading to actions) 
accord with its meta-volitions (its higher-order volitional preferences). 
Thus, if deflated-FW is mere freedom of action, then it is over-inclusive, 
too weak. 
Another problem with deflated-FW involves the no-self doctrine. 
If there is no such thing as an agent, then Federman’s description, “the 
agent’s ability to control action in conformity with will,” is too strong. 
This raises the problematic question whether “impersonal agency” may 
be explicated coherently under Federman’s Theravādin interpretation of 
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Buddhism. A thermostat is no agent, but it exhibits proximal control over 
a heating system: set to 72o, the thermostat controls the states of the 
heating system to maintain 72o, but lacks free will because it is unable to 
alter its own settings—that is, it is unable to bring about what Frankfurt 
might describe as having the temperature setting it wants to have (analogous 
to having the will it wants to have), as opposed to controlling the heating 
system in accordance with its temperature setting (analogous to Federman’s 
criterion of controlling action in conformity with will). Its setting is not 
“up to” it, so to speak, but freedom of the will entails that our choosing 
from among our desires which ones we approve of and act on is “up to” 
us in some important—even if inchoate—sense.  
Federman says that the “more accurately one represents reality 
and imagines possibilities, the more freedom one has” (9), but a Wi-Fi 
cyborg-thermostat that can detect subtle variances in temperature 
throughout a sky-riser and analyze online a vast array of possible sub-
routines regarding the most efficient blend of solar, oil, and gas heating 
alternatives relative to current and projected market prices would there-
fore have more “free will” than an ordinary thermostat. In our case more 
of the command chain is located within our brains (we alter our own 
settings, in some sense), but in both cases scientists and Buddhists agree 
that all causal command chains are ultimately exogenous and imperson-
al, and nothing in our behavioral system exhibits ultimate endogenous 
control, what might be described as our volitional lives being ultimately 
up to us. Nonetheless, the snail and the thermostat satisfy deflated-FW. 
Thus, inflated-FW is too strong, and deflated-FW is too weak.  
These problematic edges of the discussion aside, Federman’s 
main argument is sound, boiling down to the following four premises, 
illustrating astute canonical excavation and exegesis: 
1. The Buddha rejected the idea that we exist outside the causal 
nexus (6); 
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2. The Buddha rejected the idea that the will is impotent (9);  
3. The Buddha advocated that by making the right choices, we 
can progress toward enlightenment (10); and  
4. The Buddha asserted that everything is dependently originat-
ed (11).  
These four premises lead to Federman’s implied conclusion: 
5. Therefore, the Buddha taught compatibilism (deflated-FW) 
(passim).  
Federman’s argument for a Buddhist theory of free will is one of 
the most plausible among those I have reviewed,66 despite those weak-
nesses noted above. For instance, assuming the Buddha held 1-4 does not 
guarantee that he held or “taught” what Federman asserts in 5. To insist 
that because one holds beliefs P and Q one must also believe that P and Q are 
compatible is to commit Barnhart’s fallacy.67 If 5 were expressed more 
cautiously, for example, “What the Buddha taught is consistent with com-
patibilism,” then Federman’s argument would be much stronger. 
In his brief review of Mark Siderits’s proposals, Federman scruti-
nizes his two truths approach, stating “Although he argues that in Bud-
dhism personal freedom and psychological determinism relate to each 
other like ‘two ships passing in the night,’ he admits that the Buddhist 
rejection of ātman practically cancels the possibility of free will” (2).68 
                                                
66 See Repetti (“Early”; “Reductionism”; “Hard Determinism”). 
67 Named after Michael Barnhart, who noted (in conversation) that Asian philosophers 
sometimes exhibit “a blissful maintenance of contradictory beliefs,” in which case it is 
fallacious to assume they believe they are compatible. See Repetti (“Reductionism”). 
68 The embedded quote is from Siderits (“Beyond”). See Repetti (“Reductionism”) for a 
critical review of Siderits’s complex attempt to use the two truths doctrine to parse 
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Federman reasons that, “although the Buddhist doctrine of not-soul 
rejects the idea of ultimate self-control, this does not lead to denying 
that people control their behavior and choose their actions” (2). Howev-
er, Siderits does not deny choice, but only that persons exist ultimately. 
The deflated-FW view—that anyone who makes choices, does what they 
want to do, and exhibits proximal control over what they do (for in-
stance, they raise their arm when they want to) has free will—appears to 
be a form of “naïve autonomism,” which on analysis very much resem-
bles Frankfurt’s freedom of action (as opposed to freedom of the will, the 
meta-volitional ability to have the will one wants to have).69 Rats, snails, 
and thermostats exhibit elements of naïve autonomism; therefore, de-
flated-FW is not sufficiently fine-grained to represent the sort of free 
will—in the moral-responsibility-entailing sense—that we have in mind 
in philosophical discussions of free will.  
In his brief review of Gier and Kjellberg’s proposals, Federman 
says that their work “leads to an unsatisfying conclusion: that Buddhism 
is silent about free will because its conceptual toolkit is different from 
the modern toolkit” (2). However, the toolkit claim is only in Gier and 
Kjellberg’s introduction. Federman ignores the bulk of the groundwork 
they lay for the very Pāli compatibilism he espouses, significant ele-
ments of which I have reviewed above. 
                                                                                                                     
libertarian free will as conventional and determinism as ultimate, claiming that there is 
no self at the level at which determinism holds. 
69 Frankfurt (“Freedom”). Although it is true that Frankfurt is much more well known 
for his article rejecting hard determinism (“Alternate”) than he is for his article sketch-
ing his own model of the implied default (compatibilist) position thereafter (“Free-
dom”), it is, to my lights, a major oversight that few scholars have taken seriously his 
identification of the relative importance of freedom of the will versus the relative 
unimportance of freedom of action, as even my few remarks about this distinction here 
seem to amply illustrate. 
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 Turning to his own analysis, Federman says that the idea that a 
Cartesian “non-physical agent imposes freedom on a closed causal sys-
tem contradicts essential aspects of scientific thought” (5), but he ig-
nores canonical passages that make reference to contracausality, psychic 
powers, astral worlds, and related Buddhist ideas about the existence of 
non-physical items (Kalupahana 21-23, 40-44, 114-115) that likewise 
seem prima facie to run afoul of “a closed causal system” and equally 
“contradict essential elements of scientific thought.”70 The idea that 
non-physical mental conditions could have causal influences on physical 
items might violate the physicalist’s principle of the closure of the phys-
ical domain, but it does not violate any principle of Buddhist thought. 
Arguably, Buddhism accepts a principle of closure of the psychophysical 
domain. Thus, the idea that a Cartesian ego—which Federman rightly 
likens unto an ātman—could influence matter is not antithetical to Bud-
dhism on that ground, but only on the ground that Buddhism rejects the 
notion of that particular type of non-physical entity.  
 Federman says, “Unlike some libertarian positions that empha-
size only the freedom of action, Buddhist liberty primarily refers to the 
mind being free from what binds it” (10). There is an important distinc-
tion between Buddhist mental freedom and freedom of action, but liber-
tarianism does not emphasize freedom of action—rather, on my analysis 
above, Federman’s deflated-FW does. An irony here is that some libertar-
ians believe they possess freedom of the (non-physical) mind from the 
bonds of (physical) determinism in a way that could be consistent with 
what I suggested above about the Buddhist acceptance of a principle of 
                                                
70 Buddhism arguably sees all these as arising according to conditions as well, but 
whether Buddhism holds that nonphysical conditions are subject to the same sorts of 
causal laws or mechanisms is not clear, and whether or not this undermines the idea 
that the doctrine of dependent origination is to be construed as deterministic seems 
problematic at least, and an remains an open question at best. 
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closure for the psychophysical domain. When the Buddha converses 
with celestial beings (SN I 1, I 23-31, II 6, II 17), for example, this suggests 
mind can operate outside the physical domain.  
 Standard Buddhist arguments against the coherence of the 
notion of a causally inert ātman ground the idea that there is a 
distinction in Buddhism between causally potent psychic phenomena, 
such as saṃskāras, and the causally inert soul. Of course, a Buddhist can 
claim that dependent origination—however it is to be understood—
extends to every dimension of conditioned phenomena, heaven worlds 
and the like included. But whether it makes sense for non-Buddhists to 
think that laws determine non-physical things—when our model for laws 
is that of necessary relations between physical states—is another 
question. 
 One may object that most of the nidānas (causal links) of depend-
ent origination are mental in nature, but this seems only to highlight the 
need for an account of the nature of mental causation clear enough to 
know whether or not it is simultaneously physical and deterministic. 
Intuitively, it seems not to be, if there are celestial beings, or if reincar-
nation is not necessarily simultaneous with death, such that beings exist 
in non-physical (post-mortem, pre-reincarnational) realms. Of course, if 
all that exists are aggregates of psychophysical atoms, as Abhidharma 
Buddhism posits, then perhaps they can function equally on a non-
physical level that is nonetheless causal, just as they apparently do on 
the physical level, given their two-fold natures.  
 Although it is worthwhile to note these problems with Buddhist 
metaphysics and their possible solutions, we cannot resolve them here. 
Instead, let’s characterize Buddhist mental freedom in negative terms by 
the absence of mental bondage or constraint, the maximum satisfaction 
of which is in the enlightened being’s liberation in nirvāṇa; let’s call this 
kind of nirvāṇa-based freedom “nirvāṇa-F,” in line with our abbreviations 
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for deflated free will (“deflated-FW”) and inflated free will (“inflated-
FW”). Federman discusses the case of the otherwise spiritually evolved 
bodhisattva—presumably an ārya—who satisfies deflated-FW in deliber-
ately performing an adharmic sacrifice,71 but because he is in the grip of 
romantic passion, lacks nirvāṇa-F. However, not only the ārya, but also 
the worldling often satisfies deflated-FW without satisfying nirvāṇa-F, 
and surely the Buddha actually “taught” nirvāṇa-F and its absence. 
Federman also advocates wiggly-determinism, supposing 
“dependent-arising is not a linear causal sequence” (12), and juxtaposes 
karma and determinism, stating “there are no strict deterministic 
relations between the act and the result” (13). By in engaging in this line 
of reasoning, however, Federman seems forgetful of his own resistance 
to things that violate physical law. Federman correctly notes that 
determinism and fatalism differ importantly and that their conflation 
infects the discussion; he describes fatalism as “an ethical stance that 
states that choice is meaningless” (13), but he is insufficiently clear 
about the difference. I have differentiated between (hard, soft, and 
wiggly) determinism, karma, and fatalism above.  
Federman also rejects the predictive implication of determinism—
such that if someone had full knowledge of all laws and conditions oper-
ant at any instant, they could in principle perfectly predict every event—
on the ground that “all-knowing minds do not exist” (14). Disagreement 
about the Buddha’s omniscience aside, whether anyone attains predictive 
omniscience is irrelevant. The predictive implication may be demon-
strated by switching from the epistemic mode to the entailment mode: 
Determinism, if true, plus the conditions in the universe ages ago entail 
the choice one necessarily makes at a certain time as a consequence (re-
gardless of whether anyone knows this particular entailment). This so-
                                                
71 A “dharmic” action coheres with the Dharma; an “adharmic” action goes against it. 
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called “Consequence Argument” for incompatibilism is immune to epis-
temic limitations.72 
Almost all of Federman’s arguments about free will are from 
Dennett (Varieties), ignoring a variety of nuanced compatibilist positions 
that diverge from Dennett’s and better cohere with Federman’s 
account—particularly Frankfurt’s (“Freedom”), whose influence on 
contemporary free will discussions is inestimable.73 Frankfurt analyzes 
freedom of the will as having the sort of will one wants, an effective meta-
will. Similarly, the Buddha prescribed the cultivation of a dharmic will 
through a variety of reflective means that yield an effective meta-will 
and constitute what he did teach as the path to nirvāṇa-F.74  
Federman remarks that nirvāṇa, “the ultimate goal of the path, is 
referred to as freedom in the compatibilist sense” (9), but this is a hasty 
interpretation for three reasons: first, because nirvāṇa-F is obviously not 
the same kind of freedom discussed in connection with freedom of the 
will (where the question of compatibility pertains to determinism); 
second, because whether nirvāṇa-F is consistent with determinism is 
something that should not be assumed; and third, because it is a valid 
question whether nirvāṇa-F conquers or transcends determinism. Feder-
man says Kalupahana describes nirvāṇa as “absence of constraint,” but 
deflated-FW (as when a rat simply wants to run and does so) and nirvāṇa-
F share absence of constraint. That deflated-FW and nirvāṇa-F share 
absence of constraint does not entail that nirvāṇa-F is compatibilist, for 
inflated-FW also shares absence of constraint, but is incompatibilist. 
                                                
72 The classical statement of this argument is in van Inwagen (Essay). 
73 See note 70 above. 
74 This is not to say that the Buddha advocated Frankfurt’s type of model of freedom of 
the will, but rather that what he did advocate presupposes the ability Frankfurt identi-
fied and its importance on the Buddhist path. 
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Federman’s reliance on the Pāli Canon is his prerogative, alt-
hough it should be noted that from the Mahāyāna perspective he pre-
sents an incomplete account. Further, as noted in our discussion of Gier 
and Kjellberg, even some Pāli Buddhists had a more substantive view of 
agency than Federman’s. Federman finally admits that the “Buddhist 
treatment of free will has to be extracted from the doctrine, as the doc-
trine is by no means a systematic philosophical treatise” (15), a keen 
disclaimer that would be placed more appropriately in his opening para-
graph. In his ultimate paragraph he confidently asserts: “The kind of free 
will the Buddha taught is the acquired ability for clear reflection and 
wise choice” (15). But, again, although cyborg thermostats reflect on 
alternatives and make prudent choices, they seem clearly to lack free 
will in the moral-responsibility-entailing sense. Despite these limita-
tions, Federman’s analysis displays a wealth of canonical textual exegesis 
in support of the claim that the Buddha was implicitly compatibilist. 
 
Harvey: More Wiggly (Pā l i)  Compatibilism 
Peter Harvey’s paper on the Theravāda Buddhist view of free will (“Free-
dom”) makes arguments very similar to Federman’s, minus Barnhart’s 
fallacy, but adds some somewhat tangential but interesting canonical 
exegesis.75 Thus, to avoid repetition, I only summarize Harvey’s argu-
ment and call attention to certain issues. Harvey explicitly restricts his 
analysis to Theravāda (in this paper), and though he has doubts about 
the sort of free will that can obtain in the ultimately impersonal 
skandhas, he thinks that Theravāda supports compatibilism.  
                                                
75 This is not to suggest that Harvey makes no original contribution. He and Federman 
reference each other’s papers.  
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 Basically, Harvey reasons as follows. The Buddha’s teachings rest 
on dependent origination, so it is plausible to think Theravāda Buddhism 
is determinist, though Harvey is uncertain whether determinism applies 
to enlightened beings (82-83). Harvey’s explicit sensitivity to the ele-
ments of these issues that are uncertain is admirably Socratic. According 
to Harvey, the Buddha rejected fatalism because belief in inevitabilism 
implies volitional powerlessness over actions (paralysis of the will), and 
he advocated the importance of will in his prescriptions about dharmic 
action. Indeed, overall, he tends to see Theravāda Buddhism as more 
interested in whether people can break out of previous conditioned 
patterns in a self-directed way than in whether this breaking out is 
“free” in some philosophical sense.76  
 This emphasis is not unusual. Most Buddhists who think Bud-
dhism has anything positive to say about anything related to free will 
tend to see the very notion of a Buddhist theory of free will as involving 
something like a category or syntax error, or some other kind of concep-
tual confusion.77 Nonetheless, Harvey has a lot of positive things to say 
that would count toward a Buddhist theory of free will, were one to 
attempt its construction.  
 Like Federman, Harvey’s account of the relevant elements of 
Buddhism that bear on the question of free will makes significant refer-
ence to the arguments of the Western analytic philosopher, Daniel Den-
nett, who is a compatibilist. Compatibilists in this debate, we may recall, 
are those who think it is logically possible both that determinism is true 
and that we sometimes exhibit free will. Some compatibilists (Dennett 
included) think that because agents may deliberate about undesired 
outcomes and choose actions that avoid them, the lack of alternatives 
                                                
76 For such an attempt, see Repetti (“Meditation”). 
77 See, for example, Flanagan (“Quietism”) and Garfield (“Mādhyamikas”).  
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implied by determinism does not entail inevitability. The Buddha’s teach-
ings, on Harvey’s interpretation, articulate the same volitional elements 
that do the explanatory work in Dennett’s account, so we may conclude 
that the Buddha would have accepted wiggly-determinism.78 As Harvey 
puts it, “the implied position of Theravāda Buddhism on the issue of 
‘freedom of the will’ is a middle way between seeing a person’s actions as 
completely rigidly determined, and seeing them as totally and uncondi-
tionally free” (86).  
 Echoing Siderits and Goodman,79 Harvey also thinks the two 
truths and no-self doctrines imply there is no ultimate free will: “If there 
is no essential person-entity, ‘it’ can not be said to be either determined 
or free” (86). But he offers no explanation here, and his reasoning is 
analogous to the following (problematic, if not fallacious) claim: ‘Shoes’ 
cannot be said either to be made of leather or not made of leather be-
cause there are no ultimate shoes. For this critique to be fair, it would 
have to be formulated in terms of shoe essences, but I think the modified 
version of the objection, mutatis mutandis, would stand as well.80 Need-
less to say, some shoes are not made of leather anyway. 
Harvey’s analysis is rich in canonical supports. Here is an illustra-
tive gem Harvey has excavated (40): 
When someone said to the Buddha that there was no such 
thing as self-agency (atta-kāra), he replied by emphasizing 
that there is an “element of initiating (ārabbha-dhātu)” in 
                                                
78 I think that if he concluded with soft determinism, Harvey’s argument would be 
stronger and more readily understood by Western philosophers. 
79 See my reviews of Siderits (“Reductionism”) and Goodman (“Hard Determinism”). 
80 See Repetti (“Reductionism”). Of course, Buddhist reductionism is as problematic as 
the free will issue, if not more problematic, so it is not a defect in Harvey’s analysis that 
it makes reference to this doctrine.  
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people—i.e., some kind of ability to choose—which allows 
them to initiate and direct actions such as bodily move-
ments. . . . (AN III 337-338) 
However, Harvey does not put this metaphorical diamond to use as a 
dialectical cutting tool. Though Federman seeks to weaken the implica-
tions of this passage about agency (“Buddha” n. 43), I consider it a dia-
mond because it shows that the Buddha put the causal locus of action-
origination in the individual’s (non-inevitable) choice. Their apparent 
hesitance here is presumably because the very notion of “self-agency” 
seems to go against the Buddhist doctrine of the insubstantiality of the 
self, but if the agent/action pair is interdependently arisen (as per our 
review of Gier and Kjellberg’s discussion of Nāgārjuna, above), no such 
threat arises.81  
 Harvey’s tacit resistance to this line of thought might be due to 
the fact that the Buddha’s reference to this “element of initiating” is 
illustrated by the possibly-limited ability to control one’s movements: 
“For how can one who comes on his own (sayaṃ abhikkamanto) and 
returns on his own say ‘There is no self-agency, there is no agency on the 
part of others’” (AN III 338). The ability to control one’s movements is 
arguably what Frankfurt considers mere freedom of action. The question 
is whether the Buddha would extend this form of self-agency regarding 
one’s actions to self-agency regarding the will—whether he would 
extend it, that is, from Frankfurt’s freedom of action to Frankfurt’s 
freedom of the will, the ability to have the sort of will one wants to have. 
I have argued that the Buddhist eightfold path outlines eight features of 
self-agency that enable the ārya to cultivate the sort of dharmic will she 
wants to have.82 As long as the “self” in this Buddhist sort of “self-
                                                
81 See Repetti (“Reductionism”). 
82 Repetti (“Meditation”). 
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agency” is understood in terms of psychological processes rather than as 
a metaphysically independent substance, there is no obvious 
inconsistency with Buddhist doctrine. 
Some of Harvey’s other remarks raise interpretive doubt. For 
instance, he says: “The Buddha opposed determinism as he saw it as a 
doctrine that froze a person’s will to overcome unwholesome/unskillful 
(akusala) actions and develop wholesome/skillful (kusala) ones” 
(“Freedom” 40). Both he and Wallace quote Federman on this point, as if 
the Buddha discussed “determinism” in his objection to the fatalist view 
of Makkhali Gosāla (DN I 53-54). Goodman rightly objects to this 
inference, however, because the fatalism the Buddha rejected is not 
necessarily deterministic (“Resentment”).83 However, this passage 
arguably does support the Buddha’s rejection of hard determinism, by 
implication, in that hard determinism entails an interpretation of 
inevitability that undermines the sort of proximal agency the Buddha 
seemed to be discussing in rejecting fatalism and that is sufficient for 
moral responsibility. This passage does not support the rejection of the 
soft determinist’s interpretation of evitability, that allows that even 
though agents cannot alter whatever is determined to happen, the sort 
of proximal agential control individuals do exert over their own 
volitions, deliberative processes, choices, and actions is sufficient for 
purposes of moral responsibility. All recent-period scholars reviewed 
here quote Dennett, but they all also miss the elementary distinction 
that defines the debate: hard versus soft determinism, despite the fact 
that Dennett is a soft determinist. This is analogous to Western 
philosophers missing the elementary distinction between Theravāda and 
Mahāyāna Buddhism. 
                                                
83 Goodman is correct, but thinks Buddhism is hard determinist, and he ignores the fact 
that hard determinism and fatalism nonetheless share inevitabilism (one causal, one 
acausal, respectively); see Repetti (“Hard Determinism”). 
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 Harvey quotes Federman in support of what appears to be what I 
have described as a form of naïve autonomism, but one that is informed 
significantly neither by Buddhism nor by Western philosophical skepti-
cism. It’s as if, for them, “Buddhist free will” just means something 
weaker and more inchoate than deflated-FW, like “Buddhist who makes 
choices.” Let’s call this “naïve-FW,” for even rats seem to make choices. 
(Recall the discussion of the “element of initiating” above, which Harvey 
suggests might be restricted to bodily movements.) And although he 
appeals to Federman’s and Dennett’s accounts for some support, what is 
needed is an account of why we should think mere choice-making differ-
entiates between hard and soft determinism and supports the latter: 
hard determinists do not deny we make choices, but that we are free to 
choose otherwise under identical deterministic conditions.84 Keeping with 
the metaphor, despite the many dialectical gems Harvey uncovers, he 
does not sufficiently construct explanatory jewelry. 
 The remainder of Harvey’s work revolves around the following 
panoply of intuitively relevant issues: how Buddhism regards madness 
and social and biological conditioning; the relationships between karma, 
the self, dependent-origination and freedom; and the relationships 
between willing and spiritual ignorance, attention, “the basic radiant 
purity of the mind,” and spiritual freedom. Although much of this exhib-
its a wealth of meritorious canonical-gem-excavation, most of these 
points Harvey explores do not straightforwardly support his argument; 
however, they may be understood to function in a way similar to what 
                                                
84 The soft determinist thinks we would be free to choose otherwise under slightly 
different deterministic conditions: if we wanted to choose otherwise; the hard determin-
ist replies we can never want to choose otherwise; the soft determinist counters we could 
want to choose otherwise if we had different wants; the hard determinist retort is that 
we can never have different wants; and so on. The debate boils down to whether it is 
reasonable to consider unactualized possibilities sufficient for purposes of moral 
responsibility. I argue that it is reasonable (Counterfactual). 
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we saw with Gier and Kjellberg’s identification of terrain in need of 
further charting by interpretive cartographers. Harvey devotes signifi-
cant attention (47-53) to the questions whether only the Buddha or other 
enlightened beings could be vulnerable to the effects of past karma, 
whether everything that dependent origination covers is karmic (alter-
nately put, whether karma and dependent origination are coextensive),85 
and whether the earliest canonical sources or slightly-later Abhidharma 
agree on these points. He follows this section with significant attention 
(54-61) to whether karma is fatalistic (it seems fairly obviously not fatal-
istic, but it is to his credit that he gives the canonical supports for this 
view), stating that “karmic results of a particular action are actually seen 
to vary, so past karma does not inflexibly determine a fixed result, pro-
duced in a mechanical-like way” (59)—more wiggly-determinism. 
Regarding the issue of the self, Harvey reviews the arguments of 
Siderits, Goodman, and others, and (correctly, I think) complains that 
there is a two truths equivocation, but he does not specifically identify it. 
Harvey seems to think the individual is not a “myth” at the conventional 
level (62) and that its agency is efficacious (autonomous): 
As the mind is ever-changing, subject to a variety of 
internal and external conditions, it is seen as good to 
develop greater guidance over the way it operates, based 
on wise restraint and an understanding of how it 
operates. Thus the wayward mind can be controlled, by 
understanding dawning within it, so that, so to speak, it 
takes more responsibility for itself and the actions it 
brings about, such that these are more coherent with the 
                                                
85 As I argued above, despite some disagreement on this, the Buddha’s restriction of the 
karmic to the volitional seems to count strongly against the equation of the karmic 
with the causal. 
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genuine benefit of the overall pattern of mental states. 
(67) 
These remarks may be used to support a model of meta-mental 
volitional regulation and, to the extent that—both within and outside 
Buddhism—a thing’s causal powers count as grounds for its ontological 
status, they also support a somewhat Pudgalavādin-type view that the 
Buddhist has intermediate-level functional and/or ontological status 
(between conventional/ultimate) as a self-regulating (autonomous) 
agent. Harvey disputes this reading, arguing that all that he discusses in 
the quotation above may be accounted for as the working of processes 
within the skandhas.86 I am not claiming that his remarks imply my read-
ing, but only that they may be used to support it. Setting aside the ques-
tion about the possibility of affording middle-level ontological status to 
the self-agency-exhibiting psychological processes Harvey’s remarks 
might be used to support, let us focus only on the ability, and call it 
“Buddhist-FW.” Buddhist-FW shares elements of deflated-FW and naïve-
FW and is consistent with my earlier soft determinist trifurcation: virtu-
ally-libertarian, virtually-hard, and relatively-soft. Let me review this 
distinction. 
 What I describe as virtual libertarianism is only virtually or func-
tionally equivalent to libertarianism, not actually equivalent, because it 
is still deterministic. Libertarianism is the view that we possess the sort 
of full-fledged freedom of the will most ordinary folks think they possess 
when they think their choices originate entirely autonomously and are 
ultimately fully up to them. But this ability is only virtual if we live in a 
deterministic world (because for it to be truly ultimately up to us, we 
would need to live in an indeterministic world in which our choices were 
not determined long before we were born). Enlightened beings are virtu-
                                                
86 Harvey (communication, April 2013).  
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ally libertarian because, lacking any self-sense or ego-volitions that 
could be thwarted, nothing that could undermine their free will deter-
mines their behavior.  
 What I describe as virtual hard determinism differs from actual 
hard determinism, which asserts that because determinism is true, 
everyone lacks the sort of agency that would count as free will or ground 
moral responsibility. Virtual hard determinism is only virtual for 
worldlings who are so exogenously determined by conditions of 
ignorance and ego-volitions that it is as if they lack any endogenous 
agency altogether, even the most minimalistic type.  
 What I describe as relative soft determinism differs from soft 
determinism simpliciter, which asserts only that determinism is true and 
agents sometimes exhibit free will. Relative soft determinism differs 
from this simply in terms of acknowledging a full spectrum of graded 
degrees to which agents are exogenously and/or endogenously 
determined in ways that are conditioned more or less heavily by 
ignorance and ego-volitions. This latter category captures the bulk of 
āryas as well as others who through various efforts have cultivated some 
sort of agential self-regulative ability, in varying degrees.  
 All three categories are forms of soft determinism. For, they all 
allow for the truth of determinism and its compatibility with varying 
degrees of free will, even that of virtual hard determinism, which is not 
actually hard determinism because virtually hard determined agents 
nonetheless retain the potential for liberating behavioral changes, say, 
upon hearing the Dharma. 
 In concluding my review of Harvey’s account, I must admit that 
two points of Harvey’s that I have underplayed are the importance he 
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attaches to the liberating role of attention,87 and that no one thing is 
ever “the cause” of anything because things arise from particular 
clusters of conditions. Related to his emphasis on attention is the 
important fact that mental phenomena are not just what they are, say, 
like physical things are, but that they are also intentional—that is, they 
have objects that they are about; their nature opens out onto other 
things, and how one sees things is a potent mental condition for self-
changes. I think these ideas are rich in theoretical potential, but we 
cannot develop them here, other than to suggest that they intuitively 
support Buddhist-FW as well as my own version of a Buddhist theory of 
free will.88 
 Lastly, it should be noted that although it is not emphasized in his 
paper, as regards spiritual freedom Harvey seems to think this is made 
possible by someone, say, A, becoming spiritually free, teaching B, and B 
intently listening and acting on this (75-76). This helps others break out 
of restricting patterns of conditions. This path of breaking out is still a 
collection of conditioned and conditioning processes, yet what is 
realized at the culmination of this path, nirvāṇa, is unconditioned. This 
makes it possible to construe the sort of agency the Buddhist path tacitly 
                                                
87 See Joerg Tuske (“No-Self”) for an attempt to locate an Indian philosophical basis for 
free will in an analysis of attention. Tuske criticizes an element of my similar view as 
set forth in Repetti (“Meditation”)—not the part of my analysis that emphasizes the 
centrality of attention, but that part that borrows distinctions from Frankfurt. His 
objection is a standard objection against Frankfurt’s model, but because I do not use the 
model in the way Frankfurt did, Tuske’s objection does not really undermine my ac-
count. 
88 Repetti (“Meditation”) argues basically that a plausible Buddhist conception of free 
will may be construed as a function of the sort of meta-cognitive and meta-volitional 
attention-training practices that constitute the Eightfold Buddhist Path.  
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endorses minimally, even deterministically, if need be, as simply a 
function of hearing the Dharma.89 
 
Wallace:  Mahāyāna Incompatibilist Free Will? 
B. Alan Wallace, in “A Buddhist View of Free Will: Beyond Determinism 
and Indeterminism,” describes enlightened behavior as exhibiting a 
“kind of freedom” such that “one nonconceptually rests in this timeless, 
pristine awareness, allowing actions to arise spontaneously and effort-
lessly, aroused by the interplay of one’s own wisdom and the needs of 
sentient beings from moment to moment” (67-68). And whereas Feder-
man and Harvey emphasize the conventional validity of free will, Wal-
lace flatly rejects the compatibilist’s deflated-FW conception on the 
grounds of what he takes to be the obvious truth of the sort of incompat-
ibility between determinism and free will expressed in the Consequence 
Argument. (Briefly, the Consequence Argument holds that if determin-
ism is true, then all choices are unalterable, necessary “consequences” of 
prior, nomologically sufficient events functioning as causal conditions, 
in which case there cannot be free will; that is, determinism and free will 
are incompatible, so, if determinism is true, it must be hard determin-
ism.) For more subtle reasons he also seems to reject the incompatibilist’s 
inflated-FW, but he apparently accepts other forms of free will, as shall 
be explained shortly. 
 Wallace makes many interesting claims that may be adopted by 
an autonomist, about how Buddhist practices like mindfulness medita-
tion decrease bondage, moving the practitioner closer to nirvāṇa-F, as I 
have also argued (“Meditation”). Because they are similar to those Har-
                                                
89 Harvey (communication, April 2013).  
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vey and Federman made to advocate the opposite (compatibilist) view, I 
will ignore them here in order to highlight what is distinctive in Wal-
lace’s views.  
 Wallace treats determinism as if it must be hard and fatalistic: 
“Fatalism is the unavoidable implication of determinism as surely as 
later events are inevitably set in stone by prior conditions” (“View” 65). 
Because the Buddha rejected fatalism and Wallace sees determinism as 
implying fatalism, he rejects determinism, despite Goodman’s objection 
against equating them, a considerable literature on soft (non-fatalistic) 
determinism, and Federman’s counter-argument. (Wallace references 
Federman, so he is presumably aware of these objections.) But he also 
rejects indeterminism, because both opposing doctrines presuppose a kind 
of metaphysical realism rejected in Mahāyāna (65).  
The anti-realist (if not idealist) Mahāyāna idea that Wallace 
seems to have in mind, simplifying greatly, is that there is no concept-
tual-construction-independent or independently existing substantive 
reality, but both deterministic and indeterministic models depict reality 
as a conceptual-construction-independent, independently existing sub-
stantive or objective reality: on the deterministic view, a conception-
independent reality is constituted by a sequence of discrete events all of 
which are causally necessitated; on the indeterministic view, a concep-
tion-independent reality is constituted by a sequence of discrete events 
many of which are not causally necessitated. Another important element 
of Wallace’s model is the idea that consciousness is inherently unob-
structed, free, boundless, and so on. So, if the Mahāyāna model is cor-
rect, as Wallace thinks it is, then that would explain why he would say 
that if determinism was true, then free will is impossible: because if de-
terminism was true, then consciousness would not seem to be unob-
structed, free, boundless, and so on, either. 
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 What kind of clear understanding can we expect to attain, how-
ever, if both determinism and its opposite are equally non-indicative of 
reality—if reality escapes logical bivalence (the theory that every mean-
ingful proposition is either true or false, but not both)? In developing 
this view, Wallace makes insightful parallels between an allegedly non-
linear holographic model of interdependent origination, and paradoxical 
conceptions of time and the like, suggesting a multiply-complex ultimate 
(non-conventional) metaphysics shared by Mahāyāna and physics that 
renders the standard approach to free will otiose. But, as noted above, 
interdependence—holographic or otherwise—arguably implies mega-
linear-determinism. The evidence Wallace offers for these models, if any, 
is insufficient to displace determinism, indeterminism, or both. 
Let us try to unpack some complex Mahāyāna Buddhist ideas 
Wallace relies on in his attempt to explain his own conception of free 
will. Although several different terms are employed in that literature, 
such as “buddha-nature,” “brightly shining mind,” “mind of clear light,” 
“primordial consciousness,” and so on, these are all relatively synony-
mous. Basically, the idea suggested by these terms is that we are already 
what enlightened beings realize that we are, although we are obstructed 
from that realization due to our afflictions. The Buddhist path removes 
the obstructions. Although we may not realize it, we experience our 
buddha-nature at times when the afflictions are thoroughly disabled, 
such as between thoughts, in dreamless sleep, at death, and so forth. It is 
not obvious from his presentation, but Wallace’s argument may be un-
derstood as the claim that all sentient beings have, at this presently 
inaccessible level, complete freedom, understood to include or involve 
something analogous to if not identical with free will. He seems to argue 
further that this freedom can be experienced in tantric practice, where, 
for example, the mind realizing emptiness appears in form as a deity 
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(Buddha) and when one has divine pride (complete identification with 
the deity). One then is manifesting enlightened consciousness.90  
Wallace refers to the brightly shining substrate consciousness (ālaya-
vijñāna), a way in the Tibetan Buddhist tradition of referring to buddha-
nature, present at all times, even between attention-engaged moments, 
in dreamless sleep, at death, and in the bardo (post-mortem) state (for 
enlightened beings), noting “This realm of consciousness is beyond the 
scope of the conceptual mind, so its possible influence on the minds of 
ordinary sentient beings is unimaginable” (63).91 Wallace claims that the 
substrate consciousness is the same non-dual trans-temporal conscious-
ness that “lies beyond the realm of philosophy” (63), shared by the Bud-
dha and one’s own “future” enlightened self (i.e., that one already has it, 
but it is rarely manifest). In the practice of divine pride (the essence of 
tantric deity yoga, the strong identification with the deity), “one draws 
the transformative power of one’s future enlightenment into the present 
moment, with the understanding that the future is not inherently real 
and separate from the present” (67). So far, this does not suggest reverse 
temporal causation, but perhaps “positive thinking.”  
Nevertheless, Wallace seems to bite the reverse-causation bullet: 
“In such practice, based on a realization of emptiness and the Buddha 
nature of all beings, one is free to enable the future to influence the 
present” (67). However, to interpret Wallace as accepting reverse tem-
                                                
90 I owe some of the interpretive suggestions in this paragraph to Daniel Cozort (com-
munication, December 2013). See Rinpoche (Chariots) for an in-depth explanation of 
these tantric practices and ideas. 
91 It must be noted that this claim bears a resemblance—hopefully, only a superficial 
one—to the Biblical theodicy to the effect that because God’s ways are beyond human 
comprehension, it is appropriate to suspend doubt in the face of difficulties in compre-
hending God’s intentions relative to the state of affairs God permits in the world. One 
important difference is that the theodicy seems ad hoc. 
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poral causation here would overstate his understanding. Arguably, the 
idea is that the ability to imaginatively be a Buddha in the future is what 
can influence the present, and thus can enlighten. However, there is 
much in the literature Wallace cites and in his many other writings that 
suggests a conception of time and the external world as mind-dependent 
in a way that might ground what may be described as titanic psychic 
abilities. It is not clear, therefore, whether Wallace means to interpret 
divine pride and related notions in a naturalistic or in a more titanic, 
supernatural sense. If he intends the latter, however, such a titanic 
reverse-temporal power far exceeds the non-physical-self model that 
grounds his own rejection of inflated-FW (59-60). Let’s call this robust 
tantric sort of free will “titanic-FW.”  
If Wallace only associated these titanic-FW powers with enlight-
ened beings, this might not be as implausible. But Wallace claims that 
the Great Perfection (Dzogchen, Tibetan Buddhist) teaching posits the 
substrate consciousness as what not only enables “a kind of freedom that 
transcends the demarcations of past, present, and future,” but as what 
undergirds reincarnation (68)—something to which all unenlightened 
beings are subject. This is also problematic, if not contradictory, because 
reincarnation is by definition temporal, and the Buddhist view of the 
worldling is that he is stuck in the kālachakra (temporal wheel, of re-
birth). Further, if substrate consciousness enables reincarnation and 
reverse-causation, and is ever-present between moments of attention-
absorption and during dreamless sleep, then everyone shares elements 
of titanic-FW (while deeply asleep or attention-disengaged)—something 
much more inflated than the inflated-FW Wallace rejects.  
Naturalistic western libertarians would reject titanic-FW, 
ironically, as unrealistic. I am not suggesting that these tantric ideas—
fantastic as they might appear from a Western perspective—are false, 
but only pointing out an inconsistency. In fairness, Wallace could 
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respond that although ordinary folks are thought to possess buddha-
nature, and even to experience it (without realizing it as such) in certain 
moments, such as in between thoughts or in dreamless sleep, they are 
not thought to possess siddhis (psychic powers), even if āryas and 
advanced masters are thought to attain them under certain 
circumstances. That counter seems correct, but I doubt it resolves the 
inconsistencies noted above. It leaves open the possibility that āryas 
attain a state in which they are exempt from physical laws. 
Wallace proposes “a modern definition of freedom as the capacity 
to achieve what is of value in a range of circumstances” as what world-
lings have in mind as free will (62), and claims they lack it. (Surely, how-
ever, āryas—titanic or not—do not lack it). His “modern definition,” 
however, resembles the sort of freedom of action or naïve-FW discussed 
above in connection with the accounts of Federman and of Harvey. 
Wallace seems to contrast nirvāṇa-F with naïve-FW when he says “the 
Buddhist tradition clearly emphasizes that ordinary sentient beings are 
not free, for we are constrained by mental afflictions such as craving, 
hostility, and delusion” (62). Wallace seems to be saying that we lack 
naïve-FW and nirvāṇa-F, and only advanced Buddhists have a substantive 
free will: “freedom of will depends on the ability to recognize the various 
impulses that arise involuntarily in the mind and to choose which 
among them to accept or reject” (64). This resembles Buddhist-FW. It 
seems for Wallace that worldlings possess elements of titanic-FW, but 
not inflated-FW, deflated-FW, naïve-FW, Buddhist-FW, or nirvāṇa-F;92 
                                                
92 Recall that titanic-FW is the sort possessed by almost mythically supernatural-
powers-possessing āryas and Arhats, illustrated by divine pride’s trans-temporal causa-
tion. Inflated-FW is the sort libertarians think we possess, such that our choices are 
entirely autonomous and ultimately up to us, thought to be impossible in a determinis-
tic world and often associated with a non-physical conception of the self or soul. 
Deflated-FW is the sort of minimalist view that Harvey and others hold, such that the 
skandhas exhibit certain self-regulative abilities. Naïve-FW is the pre-philosophical view 
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āryas possess titanic-FW and Buddhist-FW; and enlightened beings pos-
sess nirvāṇa-F (and elements of titanic-FW). But do enlightened beings 
possess the sort of individual-agent-type volitional regulation found in 
Buddhist-FW? Wallace’s analysis skirts around this agentless-autonomy 
issue, but this is perhaps the central Buddhist version of the free will 
problem—how a non-agent can be autonomous in any meaningful sense. 
Frankfurt’s meta-volitional regulation account sounds strikingly 
“Buddhist” in light of Buddhist-FW and Wallace’s related claims that 
“metacognitive awareness allows for the possibility of freely choosing 
whether or not to allow a desire to lead to an intention or to let an inten-
tion result in verbal or physical action,” and that mindfulness “entails 
directing one’s attention to wholesome and unwholesome tendencies 
and recognizing them as such so that one may cultivate the former and 
reject the latter” (64). These descriptions also mirror the Theravādin 
criteria, but Frankfurt’s and the Theravādin’s accounts are compatibilist. 
Thus, because the principle of parsimony (or lightness) favors the sim-
pler, less metaphysically risky hypothesis, there seems to be no reason 
why these compatibilist abilities require any type of incompatibilist 
indeterminism or any determinism/indeterminism dichotomy-
circumscribing, bivalence- and conceptuality-transcending stance, apart 
from the fact that the latter describes Wallace’s overall metaphysical 
stance independently of this particular issue, as may be seen in most of 
his other works.93 
                                                                                                                     
that a being has free will if it makes choices and/or controls its bodily movements in 
action. Buddhist-FW is the sort of free will āryas possess in varying degrees as they 
increasingly cultivate the ability to regulate their volitions in accordance with the 
Dharma. And nirvāṇa-F is the liberation achieved upon attainment of enlightenment. 
93 See, for example, Wallace (Dimensions; Training; and Revolution). 
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Wallace rejects compatibilism on the ground that determinism is 
fatalistic (59, 61-62, 65), but, as I argued above, soft determinists need 
more than the allegation of fatalism to displace their dialectical credibil-
ity as evitablists, and—although this has apparently escaped his atten-
tion—Wallace’s own proposal of Buddhist-FW is prima facie determinism-
friendly. Wallace rejects indeterminist (libertarian) inflated-FW on the 
ground that the Buddha rejected pure chance (59-60), but Robert Kane 
and other libertarians have sophisticated versions of indeterminism that 
differentiate it from “pure chance.”94  
Wallace rejects metaphysical realism on the grounds of quantum 
holographic interdependence and related elements of Mahāyāna 
metaphysics (65-66), but, as I argued above, interdependence arguably 
implies mega-linear-determinism, and trans-temporality and other 
titanic powers implicitly require indeterminism within the realm of 
conditioned phenomena. He adds the conceptuality-transcending 
substrate consciousness (67) in place of what he rejects, but because all of 
these ideas require greater support than determinism or indeterminism, his 
account begs the question—at least from a non-Mahāyāna or a non-
Buddhist vantage.  
All things considered, and perhaps to his credit, Wallace’s 
concluding position is so complex—it interweaves affirmations and 
                                                
94 Kane (“Pathways”). “Soft indeterminists” are indeterminists who reject the argument 
that indeterminism is “hard” (incompatible with free will) on the ground that random-
ness that undermines agency. They argue that indeterminism could play a useful role, 
for example, in the generation of a greater number of considerations of alternate 
possibilities that might become cognitively available to a deliberator than might be 
available under a deterministic version of that process, but so long as the deliberator 
selects from among them on the basis of his or her considered values and reasons, the 
mere presence of the element of chance somewhere in the deliberative process does 
not entail that the decision is purely random. 
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denials of all the forms of freedom discussed, relativized to worldlings, 
Buddhists, and enlightened beings—as to defy subsumption within any 
singular standard Western taxonomy, such as “libertarian” or 
“incompatibilist.” But it seems fair to describe most of it as consistent 
with my trifurcated compatibilist model, because agentless virtual-
libertarianism fits enlightened beings who exhibit nirvāṇa-F; relative-soft 
determinism fits āryas who exhibit Buddhist-FW; and everyone else is 
virtually-hard-determined, because (contra Wallace) they possess too 
much of a form of naïve-FW that may be described as unrestricted 
volitional expression (which fosters mental bondage) and thus they 
significantly lack deflated-FW, Buddhist-FW, and nirvāṇa-F, and any 
titanic-FW they might technically satisfy in substrate consciousness is 
thoroughly unconscious, not voluntarily accessible, and thus presumably 
causally and/or functionally impotent. 
Wallace’s essay contains many rich and potentially fruitful ideas, 
but—not unlike the other recent-period scholars reviewed here—he fails 
to sufficiently scaffold them to support the sort of philosophical weight 
they are supposed to bear. Despite their interesting character, many of 
his claims are in greater need of support than, say, plausible versions of 
soft determinism (such as deflated-FW or Buddhist-FW) or even certain 
plausible forms of libertarianism (inflated-FW), such as Kane’s. I suggest 
that the missing philosophical supports may be found scattered 
throughout Wallace’s many other exceptional works on the convergence 
between Buddhism and science, in seed form, waiting to be watered and 
cultivated. That would certainly be a worthwhile project. It is one that I 
hope is undertaken in the near future, whether by Wallace or another 
Mahāyāna philosopher. 
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Conclusion 
Recall that this article is the fourth in a four-part series, and that this 
conclusion will contain reference to the entire series. Thus, review of 
early-, middle-, and recent-period scholarship reveals that with regard 
to free will, Buddhist thought is as complex as Western thought. Some of 
the complexity is the way Western scholars of Buddhism try to tease out 
implications of passages in Buddhist texts; some is the way Buddhist 
scholars try to extract elements of thought consistent with Buddhist 
conceptions from Western philosophical texts. Because Buddhism has 
only fairly recently begun to articulate conceptions of free will, more 
sophisticated positions may be expected to emerge. It is a very interest-
ing and pregnant phase of scholarship,95 so it would be misleading, 
therefore, to seek “the” Buddhist theory of free will, just as it would be 
to seek “the” Western theory of free will. 
One conclusion shared by most of the extant Buddhist scholar-
ship, except that of Goodman, is that Buddhism presupposes some sort of 
free will for the Buddhist aspirant, if not for the worldling. Another 
shared conclusion, excepting Goodman and Wallace, is that because the 
Buddha rejected inevitabilism, he would reject the view that determin-
ism is hard (incompatible). That is, because the Buddhist path presup-
poses volitional dynamics that soft determinists deploy, if the Buddha 
would have equated determinism with dependent origination, he would 
have accepted soft determinism; if not, he would have accepted a close 
second, what may be called “soft dependent origination,” the view that 
dependent origination is compatible with deflated-FW or Buddhist-FW. 
                                                
95 I am currently working on an edited collection of approximately twenty (mostly) 
original articles on Buddhism and free will, tentatively titled “Agentless Agency? Classical 
and Contemporary Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will,” as well as a monograph, tentatively 
titled “Buddhism and Free Will,” both currently under review at Routledge.  
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Mahāyāna and Theravāda divergence did not play a significant 
role in early- and middle-period accounts, but recent-period scholarship 
mostly supports separate treatments. I say “mostly” because my own 
recent-period theory is an exception to this doctrinal division.96 
Although elements of my own account have appeared throughout my 
treatment of these three periods of scholarship, I have not directly 
reviewed it here; but because my view is compatibilist and attempts to 
be pan-Buddhist syncretic, I see it as consistent with both Theravāda and 
Mahāyāna. I argue, in short, that Buddhism presupposes free will for the 
same reasons Harvey and Federman do, but I draw considerable support 
for this claim from an analysis, largely informed by Frankfurt’s meta-
volitional model,97 of the causal dynamics of cultivating attention to 
volition presupposed by the Buddhist meditative path.  
In summary, Mahāyānists’ non-realist metaphysics circumvents 
the determinism/indeterminism dichotomy, but begs the question in the 
free will debate (insofar as it presents a more complex puzzle as a 
“solution” to a simpler one), and interdependent origination does not 
circumvent linear determinism, but suggests mega-linear-determinism. 
Theravāda Buddhists express what I have described as a form of wiggly-
determinism, an attempt to circumvent the implications of hard 
determinism that ignores the distinction between hard and soft 
determinism, but on my analysis dependent origination is perfectly 
consistent with soft determinism, even if the two doctrines are not 
otherwise identical. The insubstantial-self and reductionist doctrines are 
more explicit for Mahāyānists and understood more radically by them, 
but that understanding has not been sufficiently set forth or supported 
                                                
96 See Repetti (“Meditation”). 
97 The Frankfurt-informed causal analysis of free will that is applied to the Buddhist 
view is the subject of Repetti (“Meditation”), but it is worked out in great, mostly non-
Buddhist, detail in Repetti (Counterfactual). 
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in terms of its implications for the free will question, although no 
argument presented here suggests that it cannot be set forth.  
Some of the remaining unresolved central issues are whether 
dependent origination is determinism, whether it applies to enlightened 
beings, whether the insubstantial-self doctrine implies there is no 
autonomy because there is no agent or allows agentless autonomy, and 
how reductionism applies to free will. Although Buddhism has only 
begun to articulate its many possible stances on free will, many 
potentially explanatory dialectical gems have been uncovered. Indeed, 
Buddhism has only begun to reveal a glimpse of this diverse potential.98 
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